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HOW TO SAVE THE CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL:
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF NUTRIENT OFFSETS
ROBERT H. NELSON*
INTRODUCTION
The latest cleanup plan for the Chesapeake Bay—the “Bay
TMDL”—issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in
December 2010 lacks an economic foundation and is therefore likely to
suffer the same fate as the two previous plans for achieving nutrient pol-
lution reduction targets for the Bay: the first plan setting nutrient goals
for 2000, and the second for 2010.1 Although these earlier plans failed to
achieve their goals, they were successes in other significant respects.2 In
attempting to achieve ambitious targets for nutrient reductions, impor-
tant actions were taken in the Bay watershed states that did lead to en-
vironmentally beneficial reductions of nitrogen and phosphorus loads in
* Robert H. Nelson is a Professor in the Environmental Program of the School of Public
Policy at the University of Maryland. He received a Ph.D. in economics from Princeton
University. This Article draws heavily on Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, Saving the Chesapeake
Bay TMDL: The Critical Role of Nutrient Offsets, SCH. PUB. POL’Y, UNIV. MD. (Oct. 2012),
available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/channel_files/19062/660_--_environmental_work
shop_report,_final,_spring_2012.pdf, a report prepared by the environmental policy work-
shop, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, supervised by Professor Robert
Nelson [hereinafter Envtl. Pol’y Workshop]. The contributing workshop (masters level)
students included Nathan Bowen, Lindsay Ehrhart, Melanie Foley, Jeremy Hanson,
Giuliana Kunkel, Fernando Saltiel, Mark Smith, Laura Vykol, and Yu Zhang. They do
not necessarily agree with the views expressed in this Article.
1 In 1987, the Bay states of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, together with the
District of Columbia and the Environmental Protection Agency, agreed to achieve a forty
percent reduction in nitrogen and phosphorus levels in the Bay by 2000. A new agree-
ment was announced in Chesapeake 2000 setting nutrient reduction goals for 2010. New
York State, Delaware, and West Virginia also joined in this agreement. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-96, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: IMPROVED STRATEGIES
ARE NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS, MANAGE, AND REPORT RESTORATION PROGRESS (2005);
see also James T. Tripp & Michael Oppenheimer, Restoration of the Chesapeake Bay: A
Multi-State Institutional Challenge, 47 MD. L. REV. 425, 425–28 (1988).
2 See Jayni A. Shah, Cleaning Maryland’s Waters One Day at a Time: The Clean Water
Act’s Clear Mandate for Daily Pollutant Limitations Under the “Total Maximum Daily
Load” Provision, 66 MD. L. REV. 1352, 1352 (2007).
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the Bay.3 The same outcome is likely for the Bay TMDL—the interim
targets for 2017 and the final targets for 2025 may well not be reached,
but significant environmental improvements will probably be realized in
the process of trying.
In order to maximize the resulting environmental gains for the
Bay, the implementation strategy for the Bay TMDL should endeavor to
make maximum use of nutrient offsets—allowing one polluter to purchase
or otherwise generate an “offsetting” pollution reduction somewhere else,
and in this manner fulfill the polluter’s regulatory requirement without
having to make a direct nutrient reduction itself. Making maximum use
of nutrient offsets will significantly mitigate the economic concerns that
may otherwise frustrate the achievement of greater reductions in nutrient
pollution loads throughout the Bay watershed.
I. THE BAY TMDL
In December 2010 the Environmental Protection Agency issued
a plan for the cleanup of the Chesapeake Bay—the “TMDL” for the Bay.4
It set interim pollution load targets for 2017 and final targets for 2025.
As compared with 2010, the 2017 targets were load reductions of fifteen
percent for nitrogen, fourteen percent for phosphorus, and twelve percent
for sediment.5 The 2025 targets were reductions of twenty-five percent,
twenty-four percent, and twenty percent, respectively, for these nutrient
loads.6 Excess nutrients in the Bay “fertilize” its algae, stimulating their
growth, diminishing water clarity, and significantly depleting Bay oxygen
levels when the algae die and decompose.7
For each of the three “pollutants” (if not directly harmful in the con-
ventional toxic sense), the overall Bay targets were also disaggregated
by the TMDL into 2017 and 2025 nutrient load targets for each of the six
states (and the District of Columbia) in the Bay watershed.8 In consultation
3 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE 2000 6 (June 28, 2000), available at http://
www.epa.gov/region03/chesapeake/grants/2013Guidance/Attachment1_Chesapeake_2000
_Agreement.pdf.
4 See EPA, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, ES-1 (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY
TMDL], available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/tmdlexec.html.
5 Id. at ES-6.
6 Id. at ES-1.
7 A Citizen’s Guide to Understanding and Monitoring Lakes and Streams: Chapter 2—
Lakes, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs
/wq/plants/management/joysmanual/dissolvedoxygen.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
8 CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 4, at Table ES-1.
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with EPA, the individual states then each further disaggregated the
TMDL nutrient targets themselves among the main sources from which
Bay nutrient flows originate: agriculture, sewage treatment plants, storm-
water runoff, and septic tanks.9 As part of an overall “accountability frame-
work” established for the Bay cleanup by EPA, a new system of two-year
milestones was also established to provide for frequent monitoring of prog-
ress towards the 2017 and 2025 targets and sub-targets.10
The Bay states were also individually charged with further dis-
aggregating their state TMDL load targets by the operating jurisdictions
that would be responsible for implementing the actual nutrient flow re-
ductions within each of the states.11 In Maryland and Virginia, for exam-
ple, this implementation responsibility for stormwater runoff and septic
tanks would mostly fall to county governments (or in some cases munici-
pal governments).12 For sewage treatment plants, implementation would
involve a wider set of actors—national, state, sanitary commissions, and
the county or municipality in which the plant is located.13 For agriculture,
the implementation responsibility falls to “soil conservation districts” that
work to improve local land and water management practices and distribute
funds from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Farm Bill funding for var-
ious conservation purposes, typically organized along county boundaries.14
The disaggregation of total Bay nutrient reduction targets among
these various implementing jurisdictions was undertaken by each of the
Bay states through the development of Phase 1 and Phase 2 Watershed
Implementation Plans (“WIPs”) over the 2010–2012 period. Thus, each
county and soil conservation district within the Bay watershed received
an overall load target for 2017 and 2025 for each of the sources of nutrient
flows, as set by the state government working in consultation with the
local implementation agencies.15 The ultimate result of the 2010 Bay
9 Id. at ES-3.
10 As of this writing, EPA’s most recent report on the achievement of these milestones can
be found at EPA, VIRGINIA INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF 2012–2013 MILESTONES AND WIP
PROGRESS (May 30, 2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay
/InterimAssessments/VA%20Interim%20Assessment%202012%202013%20Milestones
%20and%20WIP%20progress.pdf.
11 See EPA, CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR NITROGEN, PHOSPHOROUS,
AND SEDIMENT (Dec. 29, 2010) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD].
12 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
13 See Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA (July 26, 2013), http://www2.epa.gov/laws
-regulations/summary-clean-water-act.
14 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
15 See id.
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TMDL is thus literally hundreds of specific nutrient reduction targets for
2017 and 2025 by nutrient source, for geographic areas ranging from the
entire Bay to the states, and finally the local counties and soil conserva-
tion districts. In theory, these targets have the force of a legal agreement,
implementing the requirements of Section 303 of the Clean Water Act
of 1972 requiring that the federal government or states develop TMDLs
for impaired water bodies (such as the Chesapeake Bay).16 Because the
Chesapeake Bay watershed is a multistate jurisdiction, the development
and implementation of the overall Bay TMDL in this case fell to the
national EPA.17
Despite the large amount of time and effort put into the 2010 Bay
TMDL, and the follow-up WIP processes at the state and local levels,
much still remains to be determined. It was well beyond either the in-
tended scope or the capacity of the EPA, states, and local implementation
jurisdictions to determine in the TMDL all the specific projects and other
specific actions that would eventually have to be taken to achieve the 2017
and 2025 targets.18 There was no attempt in the TMDL planning process
to identify the necessary funding sources to undertake such individual
actions.19 There was no flexibility built into the 2017 and 2025 goals to
adjust the dates and targets as the likely litigation relating to TMDL im-
plementation took its course and delayed or even potentially prevented
actions altogether.20 Many other matters that could have a significant im-
pact on the pace of implementation and the ultimate results of the TMDL
remained highly uncertain at the time of the issuance of the TMDL in
late 2010.
II. IS THE TMDL DEAD ON ARRIVAL?
Comprehensive planning of the kind involved in producing the
Bay TMDL has a long history in the United States. Much as the Bay
TMDL was prepared to meet a legal requirement, state governments
from the 1920s onwards required that local zoning regulations must be
16 See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND
IMPLEMENTATION (Environmental Law Institute, 2d ed. 2002).
17 Frequently Asked Questions About the Bay TMDL, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd
/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
18 CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 4.
19 Id.
20 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
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developed and implemented “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”21
It was recognized that zoning actions might create large private gains
and losses and a main purpose of planning was to assure that the zoning
process was impartially guided by professional experts to serve a wider
public interest.22 The legal theory never worked out, however.23 Just as
with the Bay TMDL, the comprehensive local development plans could
never hope to resolve in advance the many uncertainties relating to key
factors—especially including demand and supply trends in the residen-
tial and commercial development markets—that would have a large
impact on the end results over a planning span of frequently ten or
twenty years.24
By the 1950s and 1960s, it was time to reassess the experience of
several decades of comprehensive land use planning and zoning. The con-
clusions were that the comprehensive land use plans had had little actual
impact.25 The plans sat on shelves and were seldom consulted in making
local zoning decisions. Local planners and other close observers of the
system had themselves become cynical.26 Yet, the plans were legally re-
quired so they continued to be produced, making up in volume and fancy
outward appearance for their lack of practical impact. As William Whyte,
21 Charles Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV 1154, 1155–
56 (1955).
22 Id.
23 See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF LAND USE REGULATION 66, 67 (MIT Press 1977) [hereinafter NELSON, ZONING
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS].
24 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 20
(1969).
25 “The plans prepared by consultants amid great fanfare in the first quarter of this century
were ignored in practice.” ALAN A. ALTSHULER, THE CITY PLANNING PROCESS: A POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 11 (Cornell University Press 1965).
Throughout this volume, I have consciously used the traditional ideal of
comprehensive planning as my benchmark. It has the virtue of clarity,
and the public image of the city planning profession has been built sub-
stantially upon it. Despite the fact that most academic planners today
recognize the impossibility of achieving it, practicing planners in the
Twin Cities [and elsewhere in the United States] constantly referred to
it in their public statements.
Id. at 415. Yet, even these practicing planners by the 1960s felt a “lack of strong con-
viction about the comprehensive planning ideal. They did need some ideal, however, and
they had no other” available to them as professional city planners than comprehensive
planning. Id.
26 See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 155
(Univ. of Wis. Press 1966).
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a leading observer of urban events in that period, commented in 1970,
“what all this amounts to is a lot of public-relations activity, and the con-
sensus it produced is an illusion. . . . I have attended many of the civic
ceremonies for the presentation of these plans, and I am always amazed
at the euphoria which characterizes them.”27
City land use planning eventually adapted. Planners learned that
it was futile to try to comprehensively plan the future in great detail—
especially 10 or 20 years out, as had often been the case.28 The key drivers
of development were the water and sewer systems and the transportation
system, and these should be the focus of planning attention.29 It was also
much easier to prevent development altogether—say by setting up an
agricultural preserve—than to guide an active land development process
in which unpredictable private actors necessarily played a central role.30
Rather than according to a comprehensive plan developed in advance, the
actual land development process proceeded incrementally.31 A developer
would propose a specific project for a specific location.32 Considerable ne-
gotiation might then occur between the developer and public authorities
as to the density of the project, architectural details, and the division of
financial responsibilities for necessary local infrastructure.33 When a
“deal” had been reached, the final step would be a formal approval by the
local governing jurisdiction in the form of a legislative action to change
the public zoning to allow this use.34 Planning and zoning thus actually
took shape in a “piecemeal” fashion at odds with the formal theory of
planning and zoning fixed in advance by objective standards.35
27 WILLIAM WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE 168 (1970).
28 ALTSHULER, supra note 25; see ROBERT NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT Part II (ULI 2005).
29 See MARION CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES 184
(Resources for the Future, 1971).
30 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH
TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 286 (John Hopkins Univ. Press 1985).
31 PATRICIA BURGESS, PLANNING FOR THE PRIVATE INTEREST: LAND USE CONTROLS AND
RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS IN COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1900–1970 194 (Ohio State Univ. Press 1994).
32 BABCOCK, supra note 26.
33 Id.; see also CLAWSON, supra note 29.
34 See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000).
35 In Columbus, Ohio, for example, “[t]he standard practice . . . was to zone newly annexed
land for the least dense (and by implication highest income) single-family development,”
thus precluding most forms of development. BURGESS, supra note 31, at 194. “Then, if a
developer presented a proposal for an alternative land use and requested a rezoning [to
a higher density], the city could grant it. . . . [C]ity officials did not decide ahead of time
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Unfortunately, the local lessons of comprehensive city planning
had not been learned at the federal level when a new statutory basis for
public land management was being rewritten in the 1970s. The result was
again the imposition in the 1970s of a series of legislative requirements
for comprehensive planning of future public land decisions by agencies
such as the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management.36
This comprehensive planning of the rural public lands—most of them lo-
cated in the American West—fared little better, however, than the com-
prehensive city planning of earlier decades.37 It was impossible to take
account of the many large uncertainties that would significantly influ-
ence later on-the-ground decision-making. National election results, for
one thing, were important; a new administration might have different
policy priorities than the previous administration, yet the plans had been
prepared by the previous administration now leaving office.38 Budgetary
considerations were often critical to public land decision-making and yet
could not be predicted more than a year or two in advance and were not
factored into the plans.39
It was also further complicated by the growing litigiousness in
American society.40 Opponents of proposed federal government actions
on the public lands discovered that they could often prevail by suing the
government for having done an inadequate job of land use planning (or
of writing an environmental impact statement).41 The litigation could be
drawn out for years—often the intended purpose of the lawsuits, ironi-
cally undermining the public land planning process and leaving the actual
practical role of the planning system to create widespread private veto
powers over federal actions.42 If a federal agency could not convince a
where different types of housing ought to be built; they responded to the plans of the
developers.” Id.
36 See Paul J. Culhane & H. Paul Friesema, Land Use Planning for the Public Lands, 19
NAT. RESOURCES J. 43, 50–52 (1979), available at http://lawlibrary.unm.edu/nrj/19/1/03
_culhane_land.pdf.
37 See ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC MANAGEMENT (Rowman & Littlefield eds., 1995).
38 See Robert H. Nelson, Mythology Instead of Analysis: The Story of Public Forest
Management, in ROBERT T. DEACON & M. BRUCE JOHNSON, FORESTLANDS: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE (San Francisco: Pac. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Res. 1985) [hereinafter PUBLIC LANDS
AND PRIVATE RIGHTS].
39 Robert H. Nelson, Our Languishing Public Lands, POL’Y REV. (2012).
40 THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITI-
GATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 4 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2002).
41 U.S. FOREST SERVICE, THE PROCESS PREDICAMENT: HOW STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECT NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 5 (June 2002).
42 Id. at 31–33.
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judge, it might be faced with the prospect of developing a whole new set
of planning documents, this process itself taking several more years and
then leading to further years of litigation.
By the 1990s, there was a growing academic recognition that pub-
lic land planning was failing to provide useful guidance for federal deci-
sion makers, and yet was imposing large new administrative burdens even
as it frustrated efforts to achieve more rational public land management
in the West.43 In 1992, Frank Gregg, the former director of the Bureau of
Land Management in the Carter administration, recalled the enthusiasm
of the 1970s with its high hopes for reform, including a strong “commit-
ment to even-handed responsiveness to conflicting demands for uses and
values. The rules also made an extraordinary commitment to participa-
tory comprehensive planning.”44 Unfortunately, however, matters had
turned out much differently.45 As Gregg later wrote in 1992, “we have
43 See PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS, supra note 37.
44 Frank Gregg, Summary, in HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 102D CONG.
2D SESS., MULTIPLE USE AND SUSTAINED YIELD: CHANGING PHILOSOPHIES FOR FEDERAL
LAND MANAGEMENT?: THE PROCEEDINGS AND SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP CONVENED ON
MARCH 5 AND 6, 1992, WASHINGTON, D.C., at 311 (Comm. Print 11, 1992).
45 The longtime director of the forestry program of Resource for the Future, Roger Sedjo,
writes that:
In the two and a half decades since NFMA [National Forest Management
Act of 1976] enactment, little of what was envisaged has come to pass.
Although the periodic resource assessment has been undertaken regu-
larly, the planning process has largely been a failure. For example, it has
not generated the desired consensus. In the first 125 forest manage-
ment plans there were about 1,200 appeals and over 100 subsequent
lawsuits. Some appeals have been in process for almost a decade with-
out resolution. Even when plans were approved, budgets were generally
not forthcoming to allow faithful implementation. There is little connec-
tion between the budget that emerges from the congressional political
process and provides funds on an aggregate programmatic basis and
the various forest plans developed through the decentralized planning
process created by NFMA.
Roger Sedjo, Does the Forest Service Have a Future?, 23 REGULATION 51, 52 (Winter 2000).
Writing in 2005, the dean of political science students of public land management,
Professor Sally Fairfax of the University of California at Berkeley, similarly stated that,
owing in significant part to the longstanding failures of the national forest planning and
management processes, derived originally from progressive-era hopes for scientific man-
agement of the forests, the Forest Service was a broken agency, and that “[t]he time for an
agency like the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), created in 1905, . . . is over.” Sally K. Fairfax,
When an Agency Outlasts Its Time: A Reflection, 103 J. FORESTRY 264, 266 (2005). One might
hope, she suggested, that:
[T]he USFS, having personified the ideology underwriting progressive
era advances, could lead a renewed charge up another hill. Sadly the
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now amassed considerable history participating in and judging the re-
vised system, and we agree that we are in another generation of dissat-
isfaction,” characterized by a decision-making process of “gridlock” and
“polarization,” perhaps even less rationally guided than the old “primitive”
system it had replaced in the 1970s.46
In 2002 the U.S. Forest Service—now in a state almost of despair—
published a document lamenting its “process predicament” in which it
was beset by a “costly procedural quagmire” in which perhaps forty per-
cent of the direct work at the individual national forest level was now
taken up in “planning and assessment”—paperwork activities which in
the end often led nowhere.47 The overall result, as the agency character-
ized its own circumstances, was that “unfortunately, the Forest Service
operates within a statutory, regulatory, and administrative framework
that has kept the agency from effectively addressing rapid declines in
forest health.”48 The explosive forest fires that have raged across the
West since 2000 have been in part a consequence of the breakdown of the
decision-making processes of the Forest Service and other federal land
management agencies in earlier years.49
The persistence of comprehensive planning in the United States,
despite a long history of practical failure, has a number of explanations,
including the failure of planners and public administration students to
develop more viable ways of achieving more rational government decisions
in the American system of widespread checks and balances.50 But it is
also partly a product of American legal culture. Since the beginning of the
twentieth century, the modern administrative state has played a large
role in the overall workings of the American system.51 Decisions by indi-
vidual government administrators can create large windfalls for some
agency’s quest for a new management gospel has produced an uninspiring
series of short-lived slogans apparently designed to protect the agency’s
eroding authority rather than to redefine its mission for a new age.
Id. at 266. These slogans are repetitively expressed in the agency’s planning documents.
46 Gregg, supra note 44.
47 U.S. FOREST SERVICE, supra note 41.
48 Id. at 5.
49 This was not a great surprise. See U.S. GEN. ACCT’G OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-98-273,
WESTERN NATIONAL FORESTS—CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRES THREATEN RESOURCES AND
COMMUNITIES 1–2 (Sept. 28, 1998). See also ROBERT H. NELSON, A BURNING ISSUE: A CASE
FOR ABOLISHING THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE (Rowman & Littlefield eds., 2000).
50 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUMBIA L. REV. 269 (Mar. 1998).
51 See DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THEORY
OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (Holmes & Meir eds., 1984).
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private parties, and impose large economic penalties on others. In the
United States, the design for the administrative state is largely the re-
sponsibility, not of economists, but of the members of the legal profession
who write the administrative laws and regulations. They are under-
standably concerned that administrative decisions should be “fair” and
“objective,” especially when these decisions can have such large positive
or negative effects on particular private parties.52
In the American system, recognizing that administrative actions
are of great importance to the whole nation, and that they are not experts
in such matters themselves, the lawyer-authors of the administrative
laws have long routinely written into them requirements that public de-
cisions must be based on objective plans (often said to be “scientific”
plans prepared by “experts”).53 Unfortunately, large economic and admin-
istrative systems, as the legal profession has often failed to recognize, are
not subject to being planned in such a “scientific way.”54 Since the legal
requirements for the plans still exist, however, the requisite planning
must still be undertaken, becoming a “legal fiction” that can continue for
decades.55 The failed role of comprehensive planning in the administra-
tion of urban land use regulations and in the management of the public
lands are thus examples of a wider administrative phenomenon. As the
Yale political scientist Charles Lindblom once astutely wrote, rather
52 See DONALD F. KETTL, SHARING POWER: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE MARKETS
(Brooking Institution 1993).
53 See WALDO, supra note 51.
54 See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (Yale Univ. Press 1999).
55 The largest tensions between American constitutional requirements—now more than
200 years old—and the administrative complexities of the twentieth century have invited
numerous legal fictions in American law as a practical expedient to resolve the difficulties.
Georgetown law professor Richard Lazarus writes, for example, that the usual commerce
clause justifications for environmental law often do not fit the non-commercial realities
of protecting the environment. See RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 37 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2004). Hence, “to base the validity of federal lawmaking au-
thority for environmental protection on a commercial basis invariably invites the creation
of tortured legal arguments and legal fictions,” a circumstance that also arises in the case
of American land use regulation. Id. at 37. Zoning had to be legally justified at the be-
ginning as an exercise of “police power” or as a means of implementing expert comprehen-
sive plans, neither of which fit the actual facts of the local administration of zoning. I
explored this problem in 1977 in NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 23,
but my proposed solution—recognizing that zoning is actually an informal collective prop-
erty right—has not been widely accepted in the legal system. For a historical perspective
on the efforts to give zoning a more adequate conceptual foundation, see David Schleicher,
City Unplanning, 122 YALE L. J. 1670 (May 2013).
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than following rational plans written well in advance by experts, the real
world of American government is typically characterized by “the science
of ‘muddling through.’ ”56
III. THE NEED FOR ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE BAY TMDL
Like many working planners and administrators in government,
EPA officials involved in the development of the Bay TMDL seem to have
had little awareness of the long history of unhappy comprehensive plan-
ning results in the United States. This may have been because for some
people “planning” is less a practical method of making decisions than the
normative expression of their deepest hopes for a better world—almost
a part of a personal secular religion (as seen also in the “five-year plans”
that once characterized socialist economies such as the former Soviet
Union). In any case, and for whatever reason, the Bay TMDL is yet an-
other comprehensive plan in a long history of such plans.57 The pollution
loads into the Chesapeake Bay involve almost every aspect of the land
uses that exist throughout the Bay watershed.58 The largest single source
of nutrient loads—around fifty percent—is agriculture, a mainstay of the
economies of the Bay states.59 The total sewage load is roughly propor-
tional to the total number of people living in the Bay watershed. The use of
septic tanks is closely driven by the density of land development and the
economic feasibility of building sewage system connections to service the
patterns of new residential growth.60 The patterns of commercial as well
as residential development significantly influence the location and levels
of stormwater flows that also carry significant nutrient loads to the Bay.61
56 See Charles Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959).
57 See Charles Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154
(1955).
58 See HOWARD R. ERNST, CHESAPEAKE BAY BLUES: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE STRUGGLE
TO SAVE THE BAY (Rowman & Littlefield eds., 2003).
59 Agriculture, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/issues/issue
/agriculture (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
60 See generally R. DODGE WOODSON, A BUILDER’S GUIDE TO WELLS AND SEPTIC SYSTEMS
(McGraw-Hill, 2d ed. 2009).
61 See Stormwater Runoff, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, http://www.chesapeakebay.net
/issues/issue/stormwater_runoff (last visited Mar. 4, 2014); Bay Foundation Calls on States
to Better Control Stormwater Runoff, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM (Jan. 23, 2014), http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/blog/post/bay_foundation_calls_on_states_to_better_control_storm
water_runoff; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, STORMWATER MANAGEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (Washington, DC: Nat’l Acad. Press 2008).
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In theory, it would be possible to clean up all such land use
sources of pollution to prevent any loads from reaching the Bay. Indeed,
that was the officially stated goal—however utopian—of the Clean Water
Act as enacted in 1972, the elimination of all flows of pollution into
American waters by 1985.62 In practice, however, such complete elimi-
nation of Bay pollution would be immensely expensive. As a result, a
complex set of tradeoffs must be made of economic costs against accept-
able nutrient loads. These tradeoffs involve not only the direct methods of
pollution control from water flows, but the entire Bay land use patterns
that significantly influence the levels of such flows. There is no “scientific”
method available for resolving such complex tradeoffs having such far-
reaching consequences for land use and other economic concerns through-
out the full large area of the Bay watershed. It is not possible to determine
comprehensively in advance the set of Bay land uses and associated pol-
lution controls that will achieve the nutrient goals being sought—any
more than it was possible in earlier years to comprehensively plan the
specific land use of a city in advance. Yet, in its prescriptions for exact
nutrient outcomes in 2017 and 2025, the Bay TMDL developed by EPA
amounts to a comprehensive plan for significant elements of the future
land use of the Bay.63 Rather than exact future land uses, this compre-
hensive plan establishes exact future nutrient loads by land use source
and local geographic area.64
Moreover, if they do not undertake the actions necessary to real-
ize these targets, as EPA interprets its TMDL responsibilities and au-
thority, the state and local implementing jurisdictions would technically
be ignoring their legal requirements.65 While EPA would be very unlikely
to seek criminal penalties in the event of a deliberate state or local re-
fusal to attempt to comply with the TMDL targets, it has threatened to
impose other sanctions such as the withholding of federal funds or the de-
nial of environmental permitting authority now delegated to the states.66
This is a complex legal area because, while EPA has long had clear legal
62 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-55, § 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. at
816–17 (1972).
63 See EPA, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at http://
www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/FinalBayTMDL/BayTMDLExecutiveSummary
FINAL122910_final.pdf.
64 Id. at 10–11.
65 Id. at 13.
66 See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, Regional Administrator, United States Environmental
Protection Agency Region III to L. Preston Bryant, Secretary of Natural Resources (Dec. 29,
2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/region3/chesapeake/bay_letter_1209.pdf.
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authority over permitted point sources such as waste water treatment
plants and certain stormwater systems, it has not traditionally exercised
authority over non-point sources.67
The nutrient reduction goals set for 2017 and 2025 thus are treated
in the TMDL as legally binding. They are not mere nutrient reduction
guidelines for state and local planners and administrators to take into
account while implementing the various policies and actions that are be-
ing developed at those levels. This raises a set of difficult issues, however,
which the 2010 Bay TMDL did not address. These issues center around
questions such as the following: what if the TMDL developed by EPA turns
out to contain technical imperfections and even inconsistencies, as is likely
in such a monumental task; what if the various local actions specified in
the WIPs do not yield the levels of pollution reduction that are expected;
what if the necessary funding to implement nutrient load reductions can-
not be obtained; what if strong political resistance in some states slows
or even halts some of the planned TMDL implementation measures; and
what if litigation imposes significant delays or otherwise complicates or
even prevents altogether the implementation of TMDL elements?
As one might say, the 2010 Bay TMDL adopted a “top-down” system
of planning for Bay pollution goals and necessary nutrient reductions.
First, the overall goals for water quality were set for the Chesapeake Bay
as a whole.68 These goals were then translated into specific total levels
of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment loadings to the Bay that would
sustain their achievement.69 The necessary levels of total Bay nutrient
loadings were then disaggregated to state levels and then further disag-
gregated by types of pollution sources and local implementing jurisdic-
tions.70 A driving consideration in TMDL planning was that at the most
disaggregated level—the “bottom” of the “top-down” system—the local
numbers there must always cumulatively add up to the higher level tar-
gets, including at the very highest level the nutrient load targets for the
entire Bay.71 In this sense, accounting considerations relating to accept-
able quantities of Bay nutrient loads were major factors in setting the
specific nutrient reduction targets at every stage of the TMDL and WIP
development processes. Every individual component of the Bay TMDL is
67 See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
(New York: Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2010).
68 See CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 4, at 6–7.
69 Id. at 7.
70 Id.
71 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
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interrelated with every other component; a change in one part of the
TMDL will affect everything else if the internal nutrient flow accounting
consistency of the overall Bay TMDL is to be maintained. It was a complex
task even to maintain that accounting consistency, never mind achieve
the planned nutrient flows later on the ground.
An alternative TMDL planning system would have been “bottom-
up.” Each local implementation agency might have been asked to de-
scribe the pollution reduction actions that it was already undertaking,
those that were already planned, and other potential actions that it re-
garded as feasible in terms of the costs involved. The sum of all these
actions might then have been added from the bottom up to determine
currently expected and potentially feasible further total nutrient reduc-
tions at state levels and finally at the level of the Bay as a whole. Al-
though EPA did consult extensively with the states, including their
initial WIP efforts, in the process of TMDL development, it never for-
mally released the results of such consultations for public review, or gave
any clear explanation for the methods of disaggregating required nutrient
reductions from the top down. There was in general a lack of transpar-
ency in the setting of TMDL nutrient load reduction targets by EPA.
This was inevitable because any explicit attempt by EPA to spell
out a “scientific” basis for its pollution reduction targets for the various
implementing jurisdictions and sources in the Bay watershed would have
revealed the implausibility of such comprehensive ambitions and methods.
Instead, EPA in effect negotiated pollution reduction targets with Bay ju-
risdictions and sources in an ad hoc—in part politically driven—manner.
Given the legal forces and the time deadlines driving the development of
the Bay TMDL, perhaps it was more important simply to have a target
than to be able to give a clear objective explanation for the target chosen.
The Bay TMDL, like so many other comprehensive plans of the past, is
ultimately a legally required public relations document, although there
will be wide confusion in the end because the general public has been
lead to expect that it is much more. It is useful, however, in stimulating
greater public interest in and attention to Bay environmental improve-
ments and creating expectations of such improvements that may be par-
tially self-fulfilling, owing to the political impact of public expectations.
If the TMDL process had begun from the bottom, and if all the ex-
pected and potentially feasible nutrient reductions identified were not
enough in total to achieve overall Bay water quality goals, then further
policy changes might have been contemplated to induce the local levels
of the system to take further nutrient reduction actions. For example,
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regulatory changes or financial inducements might have been provided
to stimulate more aggressive nutrient reduction efforts at local levels,
resulting in cumulatively larger total nutrient reductions for the entire
Bay watershed. This would have also involved a consideration of whether
the costs of local nutrient reductions achieved were worth the environmen-
tal benefits to the localities and to the Bay (in economic language, whether
the gains from nutrient reductions were worth the “opportunity costs” of
other government actions thereby necessarily foregone). If the costs were
too high, the Bay-wide nutrient reduction targets might have then been
lowered, until a satisfactory balance of benefits and costs was realized.
In an ideal planning process, if the costs of planning and other
“transaction costs” were small, there would in concept be a mix of such
top-down and bottom-up calculations. If planning started at the top, the
full implications for all the disaggregated local actors would then be
worked out (as with the Bay TMDL). But then the localities would indi-
cate their willingness and financial ability to undertake such actions,
addressing matters such as funding and land use regulatory changes
that would be required. The total feasible local measures would then be
cumulated for states and for the whole Bay. In all likelihood, such new
calculations would lead to changes in the Bay-wide goals of the TMDL,
given all the new local inputs. There would follow a repetition of such
processes of top-down disaggregation and bottom-up aggregation until an
overall acceptable and internally consistent TMDL plan for the full Bay
watershed was worked out.
In practice, however, the time and resource costs of such a plan-
ning process would be much too great for any such comprehensive TMDL
planning that sought to take everything into account and to prescribe
every detail of the Bay outcome (informal communications among state
and local officials, while occurring out of public view, may have partially
served to provide such a back and forth exchange of information). In any
event, large uncertainties would remain relating to the actual real world
consequences of nutrient reduction actions planned. As a result, most
planning theorists today advocate much more incremental approaches to
planning of large land use systems such as the Chesapeake Bay water-
shed, often described as systems of “adaptive management.”72 Under an
adaptive management approach, certain actions would be taken based
72 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ACHIEVING NUTRIENT AND SEDIMENT REDUCTION
GOALS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY: AN EVALUATION OF PROGRAM STRATEGIES AND IMPLE-
MENTATION (Washington, D.C.: Nat’l Acad. Press 2011) [hereinafter ACHIEVING NUTRIENT
AND SEDIMENT REDUCTION GOALS].
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on the best available information in light of the objectives sought. The re-
sults of these actions would then be assessed, and further actions planned,
leading to new assessments, all this repeating in cycles of planning, action,
assessment, new planning, new actions, new assessments, and continuing
over the years of implementation of the plan.
The National Academy of Sciences in 2011 issued a comprehen-
sive report on the Bay TMDL and its prospects for success in implement-
ing the Bay cleanup.73 In its report, the National Academy emphasized
the significant uncertainties and the resulting need for systems of adap-
tive management in the Bay TMDL implementation.74 As the National
Academy wrote:
Adaptive management arose from the recognition that
uncertainty is inherent in natural systems, yet manage-
ment actions generally cannot be delayed until knowledge
is complete and uncertainties resolved. At its heart, adap-
tive management reflects the understanding that many eco-
system management decisions must be made in scenarios
that are characterized by uncertainty . . . .
a circumstance clearly characterizing the economic activities, future land
uses and ecologies of the Chesapeake Bay watershed.75
The National Academy found, however, that the general require-
ments of a TMDL process, as directed by the Clean Water Act, contained
legal rigidities that could pose significant barriers to actually putting
adaptive management into practice for the Bay (and TMDLs elsewhere).76
Hence, even though the EPA and the Bay states had frequently expressed
a commitment in principle to adaptive management in their published
documents leading up to and including the 2010 Bay TMDL, the National
Academy concluded that it was doubtful that they would succeed in prac-
tice.77 As the National Academy reported, it “did not find convincing evi-
dence that the CBP [Chesapeake Bay Program] partners had incorporated
adaptive management principles into their nutrient and sediment reduc-
tion programs” as laid out in the 2010 Bay TMDL (and subsequent Phase 1
73 Id. at 97.
74 Id. at 97–105.
75 Id. at 100.
76 Id. at 118.
77 Id. at 121.
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and Phase 2 WIPs).78 Part of the problem was that “successful applica-
tion of adaptive management in the CBP requires careful assessment of
uncertainties relevant to decision-making, but the EPA and Bay jurisdic-
tions have not fully analyzed uncertainties inherent in nutrient and sedi-
ment reduction efforts and water quality outcomes,” and thus have not
built into the Bay TMDL a realistic set of adaptive strategies for altering
TMDL implementation as important new information is obtained and
other significant learning takes place over time.79
Given the requirement, for example, that all the local nutrient re-
ductions cumulatively add up to the overall 2017 and 2025 Bay reduction
targets, any significant departures from some parts of the original TMDL
planned implementation would require that other parts be reassessed as
well. Indeed, as the Bay cleanup strategy is now designed, the entire TMDL
would have to be rewritten—or significantly revised—periodically to re-
flect the resolution of at least some of the many significant uncertainties
and other important new information that will be obtained with growing
Bay cleanup experience. Constraints of time and resources, however, would
almost certainly preclude any such effort to routinely revise the full Bay
TMDL to adapt it to the learning constantly taking place.80 What is more
likely is that the 2010 Bay TMDL, and the planned 2012 WIP specific
nutrient reductions, will become outdated within a few years and gradu-
ally lose their relevance to Bay nutrient reduction efforts. Bay policy mak-
ing and implementation will then necessarily proceed in an ad hoc and
incremental fashion—the familiar American governmental process of
“muddling through”—and the nutrient reductions actually achieved will
be similarly determined incrementally as the cumulative result of many
individual administrative decisions. It will be a new chapter in an old
story in the workings of American land planning and its interactions
with the complex realities of American politics and administration.
IV. SERIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE BAY TMDL
As noted above, the water quality objectives for the Bay and the
total Bay nutrient loadings necessary to sustain these objectives were
78 See ACHIEVING NUTRIENT AND SEDIMENT REDUCTION GOALS, supra note 72, at 121.
79 Id. at 121–22.
80 The Bay TMDL is described as “the largest such cleanup plan ever developed by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).” Chesapeake Bay TMDL, CHESAPEAKE BAY
PROGRAM, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about/programs/tmdl (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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determined by EPA and the participating Bay states without much ref-
erence to budgetary or other economic considerations.81 In allocating the
Bay total acceptable nutrient loads among the six Bay states and the
District of Columbia, the TMDL is not fully transparent, but it does not
appear that costs were a significant factor—at least explicitly.82 No ex-
plicit attempt seems to have been made to compare the costs per unit of
nutrient reduction among the states—say the average costs per unit of ni-
trogen reduction in Maryland versus the average costs in Pennsylvania—
as a TMDL basis for allocating the nutrient reduction targets among the
states and the District in a way to minimize total costs.83 Similarly, with-
in the states, the further disaggregation of pollution reduction targets
seems to have proceeded without much attention to the costs of TMDL
planned actions.84 To the extent it can be determined, it appears that the
overall approach both Bay-wide and at the state level was to estimate
what is physically feasible as an initial basis for provisionally establish-
ing the TMDL’s target nutrient reductions.85 This figure could then be
adjusted to take account of various considerations of social equity—
including an equitable distribution of nutrient reduction burdens among
jurisdictions with similar physical capacities to make the reductions.86 All
of the above reflected what might be termed a “legalistic,” “engineering,”
or “accounting,” as opposed to an “economic,” approach to TMDL develop-
ment and implementation.
It was never likely, however, that the Bay TMDL implementation
would ever proceed without reference to financial costs and other eco-
nomic considerations. Whatever the publicly stated commitments to Bay
cleanup made by EPA and state and local officials, these were not finan-
cially open ended. For one thing, spending more on Bay cleanup may re-
quire spending less on other important state priorities such as health,
criminal justice, and education. While there was little specific knowledge
of the levels of financial burden in the initial Bay TMDL development,
this is one of the significant uncertainties that is being resolved with the
passage of time and accumulating experience in TMDL implementation.
As of the summer of 2012, considerably more cost data and other
economic information were becoming available than in 2010 when the
81 See CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 4, at § 6.
82 Id. at 48–53.
83 See id.
84 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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Bay TMDL was being written. This more recent information suggests that
the Bay TMDL will face growing challenges in three areas: (1) the large
burden on the Bay states of their total implementation costs; (2) the cost
ineffectiveness of TMDL implementation plans; and (3) challenges to the
social equity of the differing relative cost burdens imposed on different
local implementing jurisdictions within the Bay states.
V. HIGH TOTAL COSTS
Prior to the development of the Bay TMDL, estimates of the total
cost of Chesapeake Bay cleanup were made by the Chesapeake Bay Com-
mission (“CBC”) in 2003 and the Blue Ribbon Finance Panel (“BRFP”) in
2004.87 The 2003 CBC report, titled The Cost of a Clean Bay, estimated
the total future costs for Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania to meet
the various nutrient pollution goals for 2010, as had been established in
the Chesapeake 2000 agreement.88 This estimate was equal to $18.7 billion,
of which $12.8 billion was considered unfunded at that time.89 Most of the
predicted cost was associated with Goal 3—Water Quality Protection and
Restoration ($11.46 billion estimated cost, with only about $2.16 billion
funded), and Goal 4—Sound Land Use ($4.16 billion cost, $3.05 billion
funded).90 In its 2004 estimates, the BRFP projected a total cost of around
$28 billion to meet local water quality standards and the Tributary Strate-
gies associated with the overall Bay cleanup plans to meet 2010 targets.91
Subsequently, funding on this scale never materialized, one of the
reasons for the failure to come close to meeting the Bay’s nutrient reduc-
tion goals for 2010. The 2010 Bay TMDL did not provide estimates of the
total costs of achieving its 2017 interim and 2025 final pollution reduc-
tion targets for nitrogen, phosphorus and sediments.92 The first such esti-
mates were developed at the state level as part of the development of the
87 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, THE COST OF A CLEAN BAY: ASSESSING FUNDING NEEDS
THROUGHOUT THE WATERSHED (2003), available at http://www.chesbay.us/Publications
/C2Kfunding.pdf; David A. Fahrenthold, Panel Brings Bay Cleanup Cost into Focus, WASH.
POST, Oct. 28, 2004, at A10; Karl Blankenship, Bay Cleanup Costs Could Top $30 Billion,
BAY JOURNAL (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.bayjournal.com/article/bay_cleanup_costs_could
_top_30_billion_.
88 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, supra note 87, at 2–3.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 16–17.
91 Fahrenthold, supra note 87. See also Blankenship, supra note 87.
92 CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 4.
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state Phase 1 and Phase 2 WIPs.93 Total TMDL implementation costs for
the actions laid out in Phase 2 of the Maryland WIP were estimated by
Maryland officials in October 2012 to be $6.28 billion for the period from
2010 to the interim target date of 2017.94 Over the full period from 2010
to 2025, total TMDL implementation costs for Maryland were estimated
to be $14.4 billion.95 The largest part of the estimated Maryland TMDL
costs was for meeting new stormwater management requirements, equal
to $2.5 billion by 2017 and increasing to a grand total of $7.4 billion by
2025.96 These were admittedly not final estimates and were subject to
further reconsideration and recalculation, again part of a continuing
learning process.97
For Maryland, the total costs of TMDL implementation for agri-
culture are estimated to be $498 million by 2017 and $928 million by 2025,
equal to eight percent of Maryland’s total 2017 TMDL costs and seven
percent of Maryland’s total 2025 TMDL costs.98 Spending of $2.4 billion
is projected for wastewater treatment plants (“WWTPs”) prior to 2017
(thus meeting the TMDL wastewater requirements for 2025 as well, so
no additional WWTP spending is projected after 2017).99 Total TMDL
funding for septic systems in Maryland is estimated to be $824 million
by 2017, and $3.7 billion by 2025.100
Similar overall estimates were made in late 2011 by state officials
for Virginia. They estimated that Virginia’s total potential costs of meet-
ing the TMDL would range from $13.6 billion to $15.7 billion by 2025,
similar to Maryland.101 As in Maryland, the largest share of the costs
would arise from stormwater pollution control measures, estimated to
range from $9.4 billion to $11.5 billion through 2025.102 Onsite septic sys-
tems are estimated to be the next largest cost category, equal to $1.6 billion
93 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
94 MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, MARYLAND’S PHASE II WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR
THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED 56 (2002).
95 Id. at 55.
96 Id. at 56.
97 Id. at 7, 53–56.
98 Id. at 56.
99 Id.
100 MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 94, at 56.
101 VIRGINIA SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL WATERSHED IMPLE-
MENTATION PLAN: WHAT WILL IT COST TO MEET VIRGINIA’S GOALS? 17 (Nov. 18, 2011),
available at http://sfc.virginia.gov/pdf/retreat/2011%20Retreat/Presentation_Final%20PDF
%20for%20Website/5.Chesapeake%20Bay%20TMDL%20FINAL.pdf.
102 Id. at 13, 17.
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in costs through 2025, followed by WWTPs ($1.4 billion) and agriculture
($1.2 billion).103 As compared with Maryland, these Virginia estimates
show higher total costs for stormwater, similar total costs for agriculture,
and lower total costs for WWTPs and septic systems.104 The high costs for
stormwater are significant for policy purposes because, as the Chesapeake
Bay Commission reported in 2012, “implementing urban stormwater
BMPs tends to be a much less cost-effective way of reducing nutrient
loads than agricultural BMPs.”105 Hence, as will be discussed below, al-
lowing the substitution of agricultural nutrient load reductions (by means
of an offset or credit trading system, for example) has the potential for
significantly reducing stormwater costs and thus the overall costs of the
Bay cleanup.
While similar estimates were not available for Pennsylvania and
other Bay states, it is reasonable to assume, based on Pennsylvania’s sim-
ilar contribution to the total nutrient load in the Bay watershed (forty-
four percent of total nitrogen, twenty-four percent of total phosphorus,
and thirty-two percent of total sediment), that Pennsylvania’s total costs
of Bay cleanup by 2017 and 2025 will be similar to those of Maryland and
Virginia (around $15 billion).106 The other three remaining states within
the Bay watershed, Delaware, New York, and West Virginia, together con-
tribute cumulatively around ten percent of total nitrogen, phosphorus, and
sediment loads reaching the Bay.107 Their combined total cleanup costs
for the Bay cleanup thus might reasonably be estimated to be around
one-third of the costs of Maryland, Virginia, or Pennsylvania—or about
$5 billion in total for these three states.
Combining the cost estimates for all six states and the District of
Columbia thus suggests a grand total of approximately $50 billion from
2010 to 2025 for the purpose of cleaning up the Bay nutrient loads. Divid-
ing these costs over fifteen years from 2010 to 2025, it would amount to
about $3.3 billion per year. Individually, Maryland, Virginia, and Penn-
sylvania might each be expected to incur state costs of about $1 billion
per year. The states of Delaware, New York, and West Virginia might be
expected to incur costs in total among the three of about $325 million per
103 Id. at 16–17.
104 See id.; see also MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 94, at 56.
105 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING FOR THE CHESAPEAKE BAY:
AN ECONOMIC STUDY 47 (May 2012) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, NUTRIENT
CREDIT TRADING].
106 CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 4.
107 Id.
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year, or around $100 million per year for each of these states. Obtaining
this level of funding may be complicated by the fact that none of the lat-
ter three states directly borders on the waters of the Bay. In some cases,
however, pollution control expenditures that benefit the Bay will also
have significant local environmental benefits within the water bodies of
Delaware, New York, and West Virginia.108
The 2010 Bay TMDL and the state and local WIPs subsequently
prepared do not indicate where funding of such a large magnitude—
much of which would have to be new—is to be obtained. Indeed, the
TMDL, as noted, did not include estimates of the total costs of its imple-
mentation. Nevertheless, the large funding requirements more recently
estimated will have to be addressed and the potential for funding short-
falls now taken into greater account. Political resistance is likely to de-
velop in some Bay states when the demand for spending of this large
magnitude for Bay nutrient reduction is more widely recognized and
must be confronted—and the potential impacts on state spending in other
areas of government are taken into account. (Pennsylvania may be par-
ticularly skeptical, given that it is another state that does not directly
border on the Bay.) The actual funding that will become available is thus
a major uncertainty, depending in part on future election results at both
the federal and state levels.
VI. COST-INEFFECTIVE POLLUTION REDUCTIONS
A key factor behind such high estimated costs of cleaning up the
Bay is that the writers of the 2010 Bay TMDL gave little priority to
identifying the least costly methods of achieving the Bay pollution re-
duction targets they sought.109 They were seemingly more concerned with
equity considerations, especially as they might influence public percep-
tions of the Bay cleanup strategy.110 Knowing few of the cost details, a com-
mon public opinion is that TMDL total pollution reductions should be in
rough proportion to the relative nutrient loads coming from different geo-
graphic areas and sources within the Bay watershed. If you contribute ten
percent of the Bay nitrogen, for example, the public often seems to expect
that you should make ten percent of the total nitrogen reductions sought.
108 CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS, CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) FAQ
SHEET, http://www.nngov.com/engineering/resources/eng-tmdl (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
109 CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 4, at § 6.
110 See MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 94, at 53.
2014] HOW TO SAVE THE CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL 341
Different geographic areas and different sources of pollution,
however, can have widely varying costs per unit of nutrient reduction
achieved. The most expensive forms of nitrogen reduction, for example,
typically involve the implementation of stormwater control measures.111
The retrofitting of existing land development to reduce stormwater flows
can be particularly expensive, costing, for example, upwards of $500 per
pound of nitrogen load reduction achieved thereby, and sometimes even
much more than this.112 Implementing stormwater management mea-
sures in new development is usually less expensive, on average by some
estimates imposing costs of about $90 per pound of nitrogen load reduc-
tion achieved.113 As the Maryland Environmental Policy Workshop re-
ported, “[e]ven these lower-cost stormwater nitrogen measures are more
expensive, however, than upgrades of WWTPs which can range from $15
to $47 per pound of nitrogen reduction.”114 The Workshop further re-
ported that:
The most cost-effective reduction measures, involving the
lowest costs per pound of nutrient reduction, are typically
found in agriculture. Costs of nitrogen reduction in this
sector, in many cases, fall below $5 per pound. For example,
installation of forest buffers around the edges of cropland
can achieve nitrogen reductions at a cost of $1.20 to $3.20
per pound. Conservation tillage and growing of cover crops
can cost $3.20 and $4.70, respectively, per pound of nitro-
gen reduction.115
A survey of agricultural sources of nitrogen reduction found that
for methods using conventional tillage, the lowest cost management
practice was strip cropping at $3.94 per pound of nitrogen reduction; for
methods using conservation tillage, it was also strip cropping at $10.83
per pound of nitrogen reduction; and for methods based on changed
pasture use, it was prescribed grazing practices at $5.23 per pound of
nitrogen reduction.116 There are many other ways in which agricultural
111 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at 40–41.
112 Id. at 41.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Nicole Angeli et al., Creating Opportunity for Farmers: Nutrient Trading in Maryland,
UNIV. OF MD. (May 2011) (prepared for Maryland Department of Agriculture and Potomac
Conservancy) (on file with author).
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management practice can be altered to reduce nitrogen at relatively
lower costs than other methods involving other sources.
Even within the high cost stormwater sector, some methods cost
much more per unit of nutrient reduction achieved than other methods.
One analyst estimates that achieving stormwater nitrogen reductions
from bio-retention sandy soils, bio-retention non-sandy soils, installing
sand filters, wet ponds, or wetlands could range from $123 per pound to
$7,410 per pound of nitrogen reduction.117 “Unconventional means of pollu-
tion reduction, such as native oyster aquaculture and algal turf scrubbing,
may also be able to achieve nitrogen reductions in a more cost-effective
way than stormwater measures or upgrades to WWTPs.”118
The Maryland Environmental Policy Workshop concluded that “the
highest cost methods of nitrogen reduction can thus cost more than 100
times the cost per pound of the lowest cost methods.”119 As noted above,
the 2010 Bay TMDL, however, gave little weight to such relative “cost-
effectiveness.”120 There are admittedly limits to the available application
of each nutrient reduction method. It may not be possible, therefore, to
achieve widespread application of some of the most cost effective mea-
sures. It would probably not be possible to achieve the full TMDL load
targets for 2025 entirely from the lowest cost sources of nutrient reduc-
tion that are mostly in agriculture. Nevertheless, if cost-effectiveness had
been taken into greater account, it would have been possible to develop
a Bay cleanup plan with much lower total costs.
In May 2012, the CBC released a study estimating some of the
cost savings that could be achieved if planned nutrient reductions were
developed on a basis of cost-effectiveness and a goal to minimize cleanup
costs.121 The CBC study in one set of calculations focused mainly on
WWTPs—plus a few other “industrial point sources”—estimating the cost
savings that would be achievable if required nutrient reductions at WWTPs
within the same state were always made on a cost-effective basis (lower
cost WWTP reductions per unit of nutrient reduction achieved would
always be made before higher cost WWTP reductions somewhere else in
117 Stephen Aultman, Analyzing Cost Implications of Water Quality Trading Provisions:
Lessons from the Virginia Nutrient Credit Exchange Act 82 (2007) (M.S. thesis, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University), available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses
/available/etd-08302007-163808/unrestricted/AultmanFinal.pdf.
118 Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at 41.
119 Id. at 42.
120 Id.
121 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING, supra note 105, at 6–7.
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that state).122 Within the Maryland WWTP sector, the CBC estimated
that WWTP pollution costs would thereby be reduced by sixteen percent;
within Virginia by twenty-nine percent, and within Pennsylvania by
thirty-one percent.123
The CBC study then incorporated agriculture into its calculations,
now also allowing for the substitution of more cost-effective agricultural nu-
trient reductions for otherwise required WWTP reductions.124 By expand-
ing the pollution control regime to allow such agricultural substitutions
(“offsets”) as well (and also continuing to allow cost saving substitutions
within the WWTP sector itself), the Bay pollution reduction costs would
be forty-three percent lower in Virginia, as compared with accomplishing
all the required nutrient reductions at the Virginia WWTPs alone.125 In
Pennsylvania, the cost savings from allowing for the substituting of more
cost-effective agricultural measures in place of required WWTP reduc-
tions would be fifty percent; in New York State, they would be fifty-two
percent; and in Maryland, they would be twenty-one percent.126
The CBC study then extended its analysis to include required
stormwater nutrient reductions (requiring EPA permits under MS4 reg-
ulation) as well as required nutrient reductions at WWTPs.127 Again, the
purpose was to estimate the total cost savings achievable by offsetting
more cost-effective methods of nutrient reduction in place of the required
stormwater and WWTP reductions that would otherwise have to be made.
This produced much greater cost savings because stormwater nutrient
reductions are so expensive and the possibility of substituting agricul-
tural reductions as offsets therefore offers such great savings. The CBC
estimated the cost savings under various assumptions about the degree
of geographic constraint in obtaining offsets: (1) the offsets were limited to
the same water basin and state; (2) the offsets were limited to the same
state (but potentially involving multiple water basins within the state);
(3) the offsets were limited to the same water basin (but potentially in mul-
tiple states); and (4) unlimited substitutions by the acquisition of offsets
anywhere in the Chesapeake Bay watershed.128
122 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See generally Lindblom, supra note 56.
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In this last case, allowing selection of the most cost-effective off-
setting pollution reductions anywhere in the Bay in place of regulated
stormwater and WWTP reductions, the CBC study estimated that this
would achieve Bay-wide total cost savings of eighty-two percent.129 Larger
savings are always achievable by expanding the area of eligible offset
choices, so this maximum flexibility scenario creates the highest level of
Bay cost savings possible. Even with tighter geographic constraints, how-
ever, the estimated Bay-wide cost savings are almost as large—an eighty-
one percent total cost savings if the most cost effective nutrient offsets
are allowed within the same water basin (as the regulated stormwater
system or WWTP acquiring the offsets), seventy-nine percent if they are
allowed within the same state; and then again seventy-nine percent if
limited to the same basin and also the same state.130 Given that storm-
water and WWTPs dominate the total Bay-wide costs of nutrient pollution
reductions, as targeted in the Bay TMDL, a conservative estimate—based
on the CBC study—is that the total costs of Bay cleanup could be reduced
by about sixty to seventy percent, if all planned nutrient pollution reduc-
tions were made on a cost-effective basis.
VII. OBSTACLES TO COST-EFFECTIVENESS
It is apparent that there is a very large potential for reducing
total Bay cleanup costs. If no constraints are imposed (nutrient reduc-
tions can be made on a cost-effective basis anywhere in the Bay), the total
current estimated costs of around $50 billion for implementing the Bay
TMDL might be reduced to around $15 to $20 billion, a much more man-
ageable number. Even imposing geographic constraints on the availabil-
ity of offsets, cost savings of this magnitude would be achievable. So why
did the writers of the Bay TMDL not adopt such a cost-effective approach
that would save such large amounts of money?
For the purposes of examining this question, it helps to assume that,
hypothetically (if not altogether so far-fetched), the most cost-effective
methods of nutrient pollution reduction within the Bay watershed are all
found in Pennsylvania in its agricultural sector (Pennsylvania nutrient
loads, amounting to almost half the total Bay nutrients, are carried by
the Susquehanna River into the northern end of the Bay, and thus have
disproportionately large impacts as these nutrients spread southward
129 Id. at 47.
130 Id.
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throughout the entire Bay). One might then suggest that, under an eco-
nomically efficient “command and control” approach to pollution reduction,
the writers of the Bay TMDL should have simply proposed to adopt regu-
lations to assign all the Bay cleanup efforts to Pennsylvania agriculture.
Politically, and in terms of social equity, however, it would clearly
be impossible to assign all the costs of Bay cleanup to Pennsylvania agri-
culture, just because (as we have assumed) it has the most cost-effective
opportunities for making nutrient reductions anywhere within the Bay
watershed. Hence, some system of distributing the costs throughout the
Bay would be necessary, even if the actual nutrient reductions might still
be made in Pennsylvania agriculture. One method would be for the fed-
eral government simply to pay for the reductions itself, treating Bay-wide
nutrient loads involving multiple states as a national water quality problem
requiring a national solution. Alternatively, the various Bay states might
create a common fund among themselves to pay Pennsylvania farmers
to make nutrient reductions. They would have to devise some formula to
determine the relative contributions of each Bay state to this fund.
A third alternative—one favored by many economists—would be
to create a single cap and trade credit system for the whole Bay.131 All
nutrient polluters throughout the Bay watershed would be assigned nu-
trient reduction responsibilities, but they would be allowed to buy offsets
in this cap and trade credit system.132 In our hypothetical case, they
would then find that they could purchase their offsets at the lowest costs
in Pennsylvania agriculture (at costs less than making their own nutri-
ent reductions directly or buying offsets anywhere else). In this way, the
participants in Pennsylvania agriculture would be paid for making their
nutrient reductions, perhaps even making a profit; and the purchasers
of the Pennsylvania offsets would pay less—often much less. It would
seemingly be win-win all around. Indeed, for similar reasons considerable
use of cap and trade has been made in controlling air pollution within the
United States in large multistate regions and in controlling greenhouse
gases in a global context (such as the integrated greenhouse gas emis-
sions trading system of the various countries of the European Union).133
131 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
132 Id.
133 See Glen Andersen & David Sullivan, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Carbon
Cap and Trade and the Carbon Tax, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES (July
2009), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/environ/Captrade.pdf; The EU Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS), EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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So the question can now be rephrased: why did the writers of the
Bay TMDL in 2010 not propose a Bay-wide cap and trade system or—
perhaps more politically workable—a set of multiple cap and trade sys-
tems operating within the same water basins (and perhaps even limiting
offsets to locations within the same states as well)? At least by the CBC
estimates, total Bay cleanup costs might have been drastically reduced
by as much as seventy percent, as compared with adopting a TMDL plan
for stormwater, WWTP and other nutrient sources to make the assigned
nutrient reductions directly by themselves at much higher expense.134
The TMDL writers were well aware of the possibility of using a
cap and trade system, and did in fact allow in concept in the TMDL for
the future use of cap and trade methods in the Bay cleanup.135 But the
TMDL did not develop any of the details.136 In the end, the TMDL was de-
signed on more traditional pollution control lines with few specific plans
for substituting one pollution reduction for another with offsets, based on
cost-effectiveness.137 One reason for this is that, unlike the Clean Air Act,
the Clean Water Act does not provide clear and explicit authorization for
the use of cap and trade systems.138 Another is that there remains signifi-
cant public opposition to a water cap and trade system.139 Many environ-
mentalists, for example, consider that the purchase of an offset somewhere
else amounts to escaping responsibility for an individual water polluter.140
Stormwater systems, for example, should clean up their own mess, no mat-
ter how expensive it is.
In general, there remains a wide ambivalence in the environmen-
tal movement—and at times outright antagonism—to economic solutions
to environmental problems.141 This ambivalence was seemingly felt among
134 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING, supra note 105, at 41–50.
135 Id. at 12–14.
136 See CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 4, at Appendix S.
137 Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at 4.
138 Reflecting the lack of any language in the Clean Water Act of 1972 authorizing the use
of nutrient trading, EPA did not issue any official policy guidance for water quality trading
(a nutrient cap and trade system) until 2003. See Final Water Quality Trading Policy, EPA
(Jan. 13, 2003), http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/trading/finalpolicy2003.cfm.
139 See Daniel J. Weiss, The GOP Changes its Tune on Cap-and-Trade, GRIST (Oct. 23, 2010,
3:12 AM), http://grist.org/article/2010-10-22-gop-changes-tune-on-cap-and-trade-reagan/.
140 See Thomas M. Donnelly & Charles Hungerford, United States: Environmental Groups
Challenge California’s “Cap and Trade” Regulations, MONDAQ (last updated May 23, 2012),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/178654/Clean+Air+Emissions/Environmental
+Groups+Challenge+Californias+Cap+And+Trade+Regulations.
141 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175, 176
(2003).
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some of the EPA officials responsible for designing the Bay TMDL. The en-
vironmental issue should be seen, it is often thought, in terms of fulfill-
ing moral responsibilities to society, rather than in terms of achieving
economic efficiency and cost minimization.142
Another, more practical concern is that a cap and trade system
might work very effectively for cleaning up the Bay itself, but many lo-
calized nutrient pollution problems exist that would not be as effectively
addressed—and in some cases could even be aggravated—by a single Bay-
wide cap and trade system. Again, taking the hypothetical example above,
if all the nutrient reductions were made in Pennsylvania agriculture,
even as the costs were distributed throughout the Bay in one way or an-
other, existing nutrient flows in Maryland and Virginia would remain
unaffected within their own originating water basins. The Bay cleanup
as a whole would benefit from large cost savings but the nutrient cleanup
of many local water basins in Maryland and Virginia would not be ad-
vanced. In air pollution, this concern with respect to use of cap and trade
systems is known as the problem of air “hot spots.”143 This is not a minor
concern since there are ninety-two additional TMDLs for impaired sec-
tions of individual rivers and streams located within the broader bound-
aries of the Bay watershed.144 These local TMDLs have the same force of
a legal requirement for compliance as the Bay-wide TMDL.145
If costs are to be taken significantly into account, there is thus a
tradeoff between cleaning up the Bay itself, and cleaning up the individual
142 According to Stanford law professor Barton Thompson:
[M]any people active or interested in the environmental field question
the value and even the legitimacy of using economics to decide environ-
mental questions. To them, environmental protection is not about maxi-
mizing the economic value of the environment to humans. Rather, it is
about honoring rights to a healthy and sustainable environment, maxi-
mizing the spiritual potential of humanity, or preserving the integrity
of the entire biotic community. From this perspective, any suggestion
to decide environmental goals based on an exacting economic balancing
of the costs and benefits of proposed measures seems simply wrong-
headed. Those who believe in a strong code of environmental ethics, a
group I will label ‘environmental moralists,’ frequently see the preva-
lence of economic analysis in current environmental policy debates as
an error to be remedied.
Id.
143 Id. at 196 (quoting Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2412 (1996)).
144 Frequently Asked Questions About the Bay TMDL, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd
/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
145 Id. For the legal status of TMDLs, see generally HOUCK, supra note 16.
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tributaries to the Bay.146 The cost-minimizing solution for the Bay waters
will do more for some tributaries but less for others, as compared with a
set of strategies focused individually on each Bay tributary.147 To a sig-
nificant extent, however, this concern can be addressed by limiting the
adoption of cost-effective nutrient offsets to the same tributary, the same
state in which the acquirer of the offset is located, or a combination
thereof.148 As noted above, even with such geographic constraints, large
overall savings in Bay-wide nutrient reduction costs would be achievable
by allowing for wide use of offsets in TMDL implementation.149
Such issues and the various considerations were not spelled out
during the development of the Bay TMDL in 2010, however.150 It would
not have been necessary to adopt a fully operational cap and trade sys-
tem as a way of achieving the cost savings; while cap and trade would
work to minimize costs, EPA and its TMDL design team might also have
developed a full scale model of nutrient flows in the Bay from the various
sources, and then experimented with multiple nutrient reduction regu-
latory strategies to assess their resulting costs. The tradeoffs between
overall Bay nutrient reduction costs and impacts on local nutrient con-
cerns could have been identified and helped to drive the allocation of
nutrient targets among Bay sources and jurisdictions. It is not clear why
this was not done. Perhaps EPA was being driven by tight deadlines to
release the TMDL, or was not confident that it had the technical abilities
to oversee the creation of a reliable Bay-wide economic model of this
kind. At this point three years later, such modeling capabilities, and the
analytical tools they would provide are still apparently not forthcoming.
Again, this may be one consequence of a legal and engineering as op-
posed to an economic framework in which the TMDL was being devel-
oped and continues to be implemented.
Finally, the Bay TMDL is a signature water cleanup effort of the
Obama administration, so perhaps it did not seem to be an ideal candi-
date for experimenting with new water cleanup strategies.151 Yet, bu-
reaucratic caution in the end may turn out to be self defeating. In giving
146 Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at 103–05.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 105–06.
149 See EVAN BRANOSKY ET AL., HOW NUTRIENT TRADING COULD HELP RESTORE THE
CHESAPEAKE BAY (World Resources Inst. 2010), available at http://www.wri.org/sites
/default/files/how_nutrient_trading_could_help_restore_the_chesapeake_bay.pdf.
150 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at x–xi.
151 Exec. Order No. 13,508, 3 C.F.R. 13,508 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the_press_office/Executive-Order-Chesapeake-Bay-Protection-and-Restoration.
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such small weight to economic considerations, the writers of the Bay
TMDL may have built a boat that simply will not float. The costs of a full
Bay cleanup in the manner prescribed by the TMDL—especially the
stormwater targets—may simply be prohibitive, even as significant clean-
up actions are likely to be taken and important partial successes in Bay
cleanup will no doubt be realized.152 Many of these actions such as the
upgrading of WWTPs to reduce nutrient flows admittedly would have
been undertaken even in the absence of the TMDL—and were in fact
well underway or even completed when the Bay TMDL was released in
December 2010.153
VIII. DIFFERING LOCAL JURISDICTIONAL BURDENS OF BAY
POLLUTION REDUCTIONS
Because of the top-down character of the TMDL disaggregation
of pollution reduction targets to states and then to local implementing
bodies, it was difficult or impossible to know at the time of the writing in
2010 of the TMDL just what the full costs and the resulting equity im-
plications for the various Bay implementing jurisdictions would turn out
to be.154 In subsequent writing of WIPs, it fell to the local implementing
jurisdictions to develop more detailed action plans for achieving the spe-
cific TMDL nutrient targets that had been assigned to them.155 As these
actions were further refined into two-year milestones with specific ac-
tions planned,156 only then was it possible to begin to identify with more
concrete numbers the potential equity consequences of the earlier Bay
TMDL nutrient load allocations.157
In the spring of 2012, working in consultation with the Calvert
County Planning Department, a University of Maryland student as part
of his masters program undertook an examination of the Phase 2 WIPs for
152 Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at 2.
153 See, e.g., id. at 20.
154 See id. at xi. On the resulting necessity of a more incremental system of adaptive
management, see ACHIEVING NUTRIENT AND SEDIMENT REDUCTION GOALS, supra note 72,
at 100, 105–08, 110, 112–13, 121.
155 Chesapeake Bay TMDL: Frequently Asked Questions About the Bay TMDL-Watershed
Implementation Plans, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/Frequently
AskedQuestions.html (follow “Watershed Implementation Plans” tab) (last visited Mar. 4,
2014).
156 Id.
157 Getting It Done, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/Restoration
Underway.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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ten Maryland counties (out of twenty-three total counties in Maryland),
finding that the assigned TMDL nutrient reductions had in fact yielded
significant differences in estimated cost burdens among the local county
jurisdictions in the state.158 Indeed, in terms of several measures of rela-
tive economic burden, the differences among the counties are striking.
Recognizing that the figures are not final, and some counties may have
significantly overestimated their likely future costs, total estimated costs
for those counties with completed numbers ranged from $46.4 million in
total for Somerset County to $4.3 billion for Frederick County.159 Calvert
County and Frederick County are projected to have by far the highest
cost burdens per person, per household, per assessable tax base, and as
a percentage of annual county budget expenditures.160 The TMDL costs
to Calvert County of implementing the Phase 2 WIP, as estimated by
County officials in the spring of 2012, were $14,199 per capita.161 This
compared, for example, with $1,736 per capita for Montgomery County.162
Relative to the size of the assessable tax base, estimated Calvert County
WIP costs were more than ten times as great as for Montgomery County.
On a per acre basis, only Baltimore City and Frederick County had
estimated WIP implementation costs per acre exceeding Calvert County,
and in the case of Baltimore City that is due to the City’s small size in
terms of acreage (51,802 acres compared to Calvert’s 136,416 acres).163
These estimated WIP implementation costs are first estimates but it
would not be surprising if large differences in relative economic burdens
among Maryland counties persisted as the numbers are refined. Similar
equity issues in terms of significantly varying WIP implementation costs
among local implementing jurisdictions are likely to arise in other Bay
states.164 To the extent that some implementing jurisdictions perceive
that they are being treated unfairly, and being asked to bear a dispropor-
tionate burden of the costs, they may resist making the nutrient reduc-
tions assigned to them in the TMDL. They may even join with others in
opposition to the entire TMDL process. As with other important matters,
158 Nathan Bowen, Analyses of Maryland Jurisdiction TMDL Caps and WIP Phase 2 Draft
Plans (May 2012) (unpublished report completed in partial fulfillment of the masters pro-
gram requirements, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland) (on file with author).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at xvi–xvii.
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the TMDL does not address explicitly the question of guiding principles
for achieving an appropriate equity distribution of the implementation
costs among federal, state and, local implementing jurisdictions.165
The large costs of stormwater pollution controls are likely to pose
particular equity problems. Reducing the nutrient flows from stormwater
is, as noted above, typically much more expensive than other forms of
pollution reduction. Some local implementing jurisdictions—especially
smaller local governments—that are required to achieve a significant part
of their nutrient load reductions through new stormwater controls are
thus likely to be faced with particularly high TMDL costs relative to pop-
ulation and other measures of fiscal capability.166 One of the advantages
of an offset system is that it would allow land developers and local gov-
erning jurisdictions to meet their stormwater TMDL obligations by pur-
chasing offsets at potentially much lower costs per unit of nutrient load
reduction, thus limiting the distributional inequities that might arise
among such parties.167
IX. THE CHALLENGE OF FUTURE NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE
BAY WATERSHED
Besides the major economic uncertainties facing the writers in
2010 of the Bay TMDL—such as the actual likelihood of obtaining nu-
trient reduction funding on the scale needed—there were also large un-
certainties relating to levels of future new commercial and residential
development in the Bay watershed over the period from 2010 to 2025.168
While projections of future growth are available, they are of uncertain
reliability. Substantial growth might occur in an area where it is not now
expected, while other areas expected in 2010 to grow rapidly might not
actually experience such growth in the years to come. This uncertainty
significantly complicates the task of disaggregating overall Bay pollution
targets to the states and other substate areas for times as far in the fu-
ture as 2017 and 2025.
165 See CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD, supra note 11.
166 Bowen, supra note 158.
167 Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at 66.
168 For discussion of the methods and uncertainties of estimating 2025 Bay levels of land
development and population, see Establishing the Phase III WIPs on Forecasted 2025 Land-
Use Conditions, CHESAPEAKEBAY.NET, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/channel_files/19130
/issue_paper_v2_establishing_phase_iii_wips_on_a_future_2025_land_use.pdf (last visited
Mar. 4, 2014).
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According to the Maryland Department of Planning (“MDP”), for
example, if current trends continue, it is estimated that Maryland will
add another 478,000 households from 2010 to 2035.169 MDP further
estimates that about seventy-six percent of these households will be
served by WWTPs and twenty-four percent by septic systems.170 The
actual outcome is important because the Bay nutrient load per household
from new development on well and septic systems is about six times as
great as new nutrient loads from sewered areas.171 The total Maryland
nitrogen loads from the new development projected would amount to an
additional 3.66 million pounds of nitrogen per year by 2035.172
The TMDL total nitrogen reduction target for 2025 in Maryland
is 11.83 million pounds.173 New development occurring from 2010 to 2035
will thus work to counteract about thirty percent of the total Maryland
target for nitrogen reductions from 2010 to 2025. This new development,
moreover, will be concentrated in certain geographic areas of Maryland
where the added nutrients will probably be well above thirty percent.
One approach would be to simply go with the best future growth projec-
tions available and to factor these into the development of the Bay TMDL
and the WIPs. It is usual in efforts such as the Bay TMDL to develop a
“baseline” estimate of future events under “business as usual.”174 The
necessary actions (such as nutrient reductions) to achieve a future goal
then take account not only of the status quo at present, but also of the
expected future baseline events that will affect the ability to achieve the
goals (such as new land use development in the Bay watershed in the
case of the TMDL).
The writers of the TMDL, however, did not adopt this standard
approach.175 Perhaps they were concerned about the many large uncer-
tainties relating to the absolute magnitudes and locations of future Bay
growth. They may have also been concerned that such an approach would
169 Maryland Department of Planning, Plan Maryland: A Sustainable Growth Plan for
the 21st Century Figure 2-9 (Dec. 2011), available at http://plan.maryland.gov/PDF/plan
/PlanMaryland_Final.pdf.
170 Id. at Figure 2-10.
171 Id. at Figure 2-9.
172 Id. at Figure 2-38.
173 MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, supra note 94, at 28–29.
174 For an example of the use of the “business as usual” approach in the area of climate
change, see Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth Stanton, The Cost of Climate Change: What
We’ll Pay if Global Warming Continues Unchecked, NAT. RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
(May 2008), available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/cost/fcost.pdf.
175 See ACHIEVING NUTRIENT AND SEDIMENT REDUCTION GOALS, supra note 72, at 109.
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have required them to plan for significantly larger nutrient reductions in
order to achieve 2025 targets, raising the total estimated costs (already
high) of implementing the Bay TMDL. If larger nutrient reductions had
to come in part from existing sources to accommodate new development,
these sources in a certain sense would have been paying the price to cre-
ate room for additional future nutrient flows from new growth within the
overall Bay watershed.
A possible approach would be a requirement to routinely revisit
the TMDL and the nutrient targets as the details of actual growth be-
come known in future years. In effect, a modified TMDL would have to
be written as uncertainties about growth were being resolved by actual
experience. This would also be an unappealing prospect, however, in
light of the high transaction costs of writing TMDLs, and the new public
controversies that might be provoked. The 2010 Bay TMDL therefore also
did not adopt this approach.176 Given the somewhat intractable nature
of the problem of nutrient flows from future significant new growth and
development, the best the Bay TMDL writers could do was to recommend
that future new development be required to obtain offsets to the new
pollution loads it was generating.177
Yet, despite the large importance to the TMDL of offsets in dealing
with new development, the TMDL provided few details concerning the
design and workings of future offset systems.178 Given the lack of more
specific Bay-wide guidance from the 2010 TMDL, each Bay state has been
left largely to pursue its own course in the development of an offset sys-
tem.179 Most states have said that they expect to have the design of an
offset system in place by 2013 but matters appear to be proceeding more
slowly in this critical area.180 A number of major policy and management
issues—such as the geographic boundaries for the availability of offsets
in potential new cap and trade systems—will have to be resolved in order
to put an operating offset system into place.181
176 Id. at 108.
177 CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, EPA 10-1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd
/pdf/pdf_chesbay/FinalBayTMDL/CBayFinalTMDLSection10_final.pdf.
178 See Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at xviii.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id; Maryland’s Trading and Offset Programs Review Observations, EPA, 2–3 (Feb.
2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/Phase2WIPEvals/Trading
_Offsets/MDFinalReport.pdf. See generally Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
354 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 38:319
X. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OFFSETS
The concept of offsets was first developed as an implementation
strategy under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).182 Enacted in 1970, the CAA
required EPA to set national ambient air quality standards and to desig-
nate those parts of the United States that were in “nonattainment” of
these standards.183 The states were then assigned the responsibility to
develop “state implementation plans” (“SIPs”)184 that would lead to future
attainment of the air quality standards.185 The writing of a SIP was thus
a CAA analogue and predecessor to the writing of a TMDL to achieve
water quality standards in a given river, lake or other water body.
As with new land development in the Chesapeake Bay watershed
(one might call it a water quality “nonattainment” area), new sources of
air pollution that located in air nonattainment areas would add to the
existing problem of pollution.186 As with the Bay, these new sources could
not easily be predicted in advance.187 As with the Bay and land develop-
ment, moreover, it was politically unacceptable for EPA simply to declare
that all new sources of air pollution would be excluded across the wide
sections of the United States that were in nonattainment of the air qual-
ity standards.188 The solution adopted by EPA in the 1970s was to allow
new sources of air pollution to locate in nonattainment areas but to require
these sources to generate an offset to their own additional pollution.189
Such air pollution offsets would be generated by actions that re-
duced air pollutant loads somewhere else—for example, another existing
air polluter might take action to reduce its own pollution flows. Indeed,
as EPA implemented the policy, new sources of air pollution would often
be required to generate more than a one-to-one offset within a nonattain-
ment area.190 In this manner, new sources of pollution could actually con-
tribute to improved air quality in these air nonattainment areas, since
the pollution offsets generated would be greater than the additional
pollution created by the new source.
182 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970); Wallace E. Oates, From Research to
Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 135, 142–43 (2000).
183 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d), 7409 (1970).
184 Id. § 7410(a).
185 Oates, supra note 182, at 142–43.
186 Id. at 143.
187 Id.
188 Id at 138–39.
189 Id. at 143; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c).
190 See Karen Fisher-Vanden & Sheila Olmstead, Moving Pollution Trading from Air to
Water: Potential, Problems, and Prognosis, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 147, 160 (Winter 2013).
2014] HOW TO SAVE THE CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL 355
In short, if new industrial source A would add 100 units of new air
pollution in a nonattainment area, it would be responsible for finding an
existing pollution source B that would reduce its emissions by say 1.5A
units depending on the offset trading ratio. In addition, before relying on
such offsets, the new source A would be required to adopt the most ef-
fective pollution abatement technology that is currently legally required,
thus minimizing its own new levels of emissions.191 Such experiences
with direct offsets under the Clean Air Act set the stage for the tradable
permit market established for sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) and nitrogen oxides
(“NOx”) under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.192 Since the 1990 law
was enacted, SO2 emissions have fallen by around 10 million tons, a 60
percent reduction.193 This has sharply reduced the frequency and severity
of acid rain, helping to improve water quality in northeastern states.194
Equally or more important, it has also significantly reduced the amount
of small particulate matter in the air, curbing mortality and also yielding
other benefits to human health.195 The SO2 emissions “allowance” trading
market—the “cap and trade” system—first established by the 1990 CAA
Amendments is widely regarded as a major success story and as a good
model for the wider use of market forces to set clear future environmen-
tal targets that can then be achieved at reduced costs.196
An offset system is sometimes regarded as identical to an emis-
sions credit trading system. Some discussions of cap and trade in fact refer
to “credits” and “offsets” interchangeably.197 While there is no standard
protocol, it might be helpful to suggest a specific meaning of each term.
In common usage, an “offset” might be seen as a more general term while
an emissions trading “credit” is a particular form of offset involving some
form of financial transaction. But there can be other ways which offsets
might be created and acquired. Whether money is involved or not, pol-
luter A may simply engage directly with some other polluter C to make
offsetting reductions in the levels of pollution from C. Unlike the pricing
and other impersonal market features of a full scale emissions credit
191 6.2.1 Offset Program, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/dcee735e22c76aef
85257662005f4116/aa3d2e8d44f91af38525777d000cbcba!OpenDocument (last updated
Feb. 25, 2014).
192 Oates, supra note 182, at 136.
193 SO2 Emission Reductions from Acid Rain Program Sources and Improvements in Air
Quality, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/maps/so2.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970).
197 Maryland’s Trading and Offset Programs Review Observations, supra note 181.
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trading system, such a personal transaction among two parties might be
compared with a barter exchange. Additionally, if polluter A has multiple
sources of pollution within its company operations, it might be able to
generate needed offsets within the same firm itself—by reducing its pol-
lution levels at one firm location to compensate for increased pollution
levels at another location.
XI. BAY USE OF OFFSETS
Besides providing a means of dealing with the problem of new
development, as discussed above, offsets offer the possibility of large cost
savings in the overall implementation of the Bay TMDL.198 Among the
six Bay states and the District of Columbia, Virginia has gone the far-
thest in putting an offset system for its Bay water quality program into
practice.199 Authorized by the legislature in 2005, and beginning opera-
tions in 2007, the Virginia Exchange Program allows for WWTPs to ac-
quire offsets as a way of meeting their individual Wasteload Allocations
(“WLAs”).200 Specifically, a WWTP can purchase a nutrient “credit” from
another WWTP to meet its WLA.201 A credit is generated at a WWTP by
reducing its nutrient flows below its WLA.202 The Exchange Program also
allows for the acquisition of non-point source load allocations through the
use of agricultural best management practices (“BMPs”) within the same
basin as the WWTP discharger, although little such activity has occurred.203
For those local stormwater systems regulated by EPA, as autho-
rized by new Virginia legislation in 2011 (SB 1099),204 any locality that
has adopted a local stormwater management program can allow offsets
as long as:
[T]he applicant demonstrates that alternative site designs
have been considered that may accommodate on-site
BMPs, on-site BMPs have been considered in alterna-
tive site designs to the maximum extent practicable, and
198 VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.19.15.C (2011).
199 VPDES Watershed General Permit for Nutrient Discharges to the Chesapeake Bay, VA
DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.deq.virginia.gov/Programs/Water/PermittingCompli
ance/PollutionDischargeElimination/NutrientTrading.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
200 VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.19.15.B.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 VA. CODE ANN. § 603.8:1 (2011).
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post-development nonpoint nutrient runoff compliance
requirements cannot be met on site. If the applicant dem-
onstrates on-site control of at least 75% of the required
phosphorous reductions, the applicant will then be allowed
to purchase offsets.205
Such offsets must have already been established and available prior to
development of the site.206 Furthermore, the offsets must be available in
the same tributary as the development activity and within allowable hy-
drologic unit codes.207
In the District of Columbia, the Department of the Environment
(“DDOE”) adopted a program in 2012 to allow offsets as part of its new
mandated 1.2” stormwater retention standard.208 The offsets take the
form of “Stormwater Retention Credits” (“SRCs”) that can be acquired
elsewhere in lieu of full retention compliance onsite.209 SRC eligible proj-
ects include filtering systems, infiltration practices, storage practices,
stormwater ponds, stormwater wetlands, and open channels.210 The Dis-
trict will require “trading ratios” of greater than 1—perhaps 1.5.211 The
acquirer of an SRC would have to offset more than the amount of addi-
tional stormwater left onsite. The District expects that the use of offsets
in its stormwater retention program for new development will result not
only in significant cost savings but also in the retention of greater total
amounts of stormwater District-wide (due to the trading ratios greater
than 1).
The other Bay state with experience in the use of nutrient off-
sets is Pennsylvania.212 The state’s Nutrient Credit Trading Program
(“NCT”), administered by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (“PADEP”), is limited to municipal and industrial holders
of EPA permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Proposed Regulations Open Door to Offsite Compliance Options in Washington, DC,
GREEN GROUND LAW PLLC (June 2013), http://greengroundlaw.com/wp-content/uploads
/2013/06/Proposed-DC-Stormwater-Regulations.pdf.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See Nutrient Trading, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal
/server.pt/community/nutrient_trading/21451 (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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System (“NPDES”).213 Offsets must be generated within the same water
basin (primarily in practice the Susquehanna); both point and non-point
sources are eligible to generate offsets.214 Most of the limited trading thus
far has been for nitrogen credits, although phosphorous and sediment
offsets are also allowed.215
In 2008, Lycoming County, PA, for example, was faced with a major
issue: seven WWTPs in need of $225 million in upgrades.216 To address
this problem, Lycoming created a county-based nutrient trading program
that followed the outlines of the PADEP program.217 The Lycoming County
Conservation District calculates offset credits, and DEP certifies them
through the state’s trading program.218 One WWTP in the county estimates
that it can save $1.2 million over a twenty year period by purchasing nutri-
ent credits rather than expensive upgrading.219 Throughout Pennsylvania,
thirty-one nutrient reduction projects were certified in Pennsylvania in
the compliance year of October 2010 to September 2011 amounting to
358,971 lbs of nitrogen and 10,546 lbs of phosphorus available as off-
sets.220 At a state credit auction in September 2012, 36,650 nitrogen credits
(including for future years up to 2015) were sold for prices ranging from
$3.17 to $3.23.221
Although no sales of offsets had occurred in Maryland as of the
summer of 2012, nutrient trading is included in Phase II of Maryland’s
WIP, including non-point to non-point source trading.222 The broad policy
213 Nutrient Credit Trading Program, PENNVEST, http://www.pennvest.state.pa.us/portal
/server.pt/community/nutrient_credit_trading/19518 (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
214 The Conowingo Dam and Chesapeake Bay Water Quality, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM
BACKGROUNDER, available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/documents/Backgrounder
_-_Conowingo_Dam_1_14_13_FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
215 Id.
216 PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA CHESAPEAKE WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN, PHASE 2, at 17–19 (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf
/pdf_chesbay/PhaseIIWIPS/PAFINALPhase2WIP3-30-2012.pdf.
217 Id. at 18.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 19.
220 Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at 133.
221 Public Results for Pennvest Auction Round 1 September 12, 2012, MARKIT (2012), http://
www.markit.com/assets/en/docs/products/environmental/auctions/Public%20result%2009
-12-12-B.pdf.
222 See MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, MARYLAND POLICY FOR NUTRIENT CAP MGMT. AND TRADING
IN MARYLAND’S CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www
.mde.state.md.us/programs/Water/TMDL/TMDLImplementation/Documents/Accountfor
Growth/NutrientCap_Trading_Policy_April_2008.pdf. See also MD. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
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provisions were set out for nutrient trading in a 2008 document from the
Department of the Environment.223 Farmers must first meet any legal re-
quirements for nutrient reductions (their “baseline requirements”) before
they can sell additional reductions as credits.224 Maryland has specifically
identified three categories of nutrient reduction practices potentially going
beyond baseline requirements that can be used as offsets: (1) BMPs with
approved load reductions such as no till riparian forest buffers and grass
buffers, wetland restoration, tree planting, cover crops, and animal man-
agement systems; (2) BMPs requiring technical review such as dairy feed-
ing, precision agriculture, conservation tillage, precision grazing, water
control structure, stream restoration, cropland conversion, and ammonia
emission reduction; and (3) other BMP practices or innovative approaches
such as algal turf scrubbers, oyster aquaculture, manure incorporation,
and phosphorus-absorbing materials.225 Other Maryland guidelines in-
clude a requirement that nutrient credits must be used in the year in
which they are acquired.226 Also, the full annual credit produced by the
practice will not be certified until the year following the year of BMP in-
stallation.227 An important limitation is that farmers cannot use federal
or state cost-share funds to generate offsets (the projects can, however,
be used to generate credits after the contracted funding period for the
BMP actions has expired).228 Also they cannot generate credits or other
offsets by retiring farmland from active production.229 Maryland has been
slow, however, in working out and incorporating into regulations the
details for implementing an offset program.
MARYLAND POLICY FOR NUTRIENT CAP MGMT. AND TRADING IN MARYLAND’S CHESAPEAKE
BAY WATERSHED, PHASE II-B: GUIDELINES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF NONPOINT CREDITS,
MARYLAND’S TRADING MARKET PLACE (Apr. 2008), available at http://mdnutrienttrading
.org/docs/Phase%20II-B_Crdt%20Purchase.pdf.
223 See generally MD. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MARYLAND POLICY FOR NUTRIENT CAP MGMT. AND
TRADING IN MARYLAND’S CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED, PHASE II-B: GUIDELINES FOR THE
EXCHANGE OF NONPOINT CREDITS, MARYLAND’S TRADING MARKET PLACE, supra note 222.
224 Id. at 6, 12.
225 See MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, MARYLAND POLICY FOR NUTRIENT CAP MGMT. AND
TRADING IN MARYLAND’S CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED, supra note 222, at 19.
226 Id. at 5, 10.
227 What Is Maryland’s Trading Program, MD. NUTRIENT TRADING, http://www.md
nutrienttrading.com/ntwhatis.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
228 Id.
229 See MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, MARYLAND POLICY FOR NUTRIENT CAP MGMT. AND
TRADING IN MARYLAND’S CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED, supra note 222, at 1.
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XII. CONSIDERING AN ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL
BASELINE DEFINITION
Under existing Maryland policy (and similar policies in other Bay
states), as noted above, any generation of agricultural nutrient offsets
will require first bringing a farmer’s nutrient loads below the current
baseline nutrient requirements—as established in existing law and regu-
lation.230 There is no assurance, however, that most farmers will achieve
their baseline requirements at any time soon. EPA authority to regulate
non-point sources of pollution such as agriculture is uncertain. States
have been reluctant to impose meaningful penalties on farmers failing
to fully implement legally mandated new BMPs that are designed to re-
duce nutrient loads.231 Even if they sought to do so, enforcement of BMP
requirements dealing with the actions of many thousands of individual
farmers is notoriously difficult.232 Indeed, farmers have often been willing
to make significant changes in nutrient management practices only when
they have been paid for doing so by government programs, especially those
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture under the Farm Bill.233 Yet, with
current federal budget pressures, that source of funding may be cut back
in the future.
In concept, a baseline is a farm outcome that would be achieved
in the absence of the payment for an offset or credit.234 In the real world,
however, as experience has often shown, legal requirements are not self-
enforcing and can even become altogether fictional. Hence, in the case of
implementing the Bay TMDL, given that full farmer compliance with
state nutrient management requirements may be problematic, it may be
desirable to encourage farmers to take nutrient reducing actions even
when they have not yet fully met all legal requirements (stated another
way, full “additionality” above the baseline would not be required of the
farmer). If they have not yet met their nutrient baselines as defined in
230 What is Maryland’s Trading Program, supra note 227.
231 Michelle Perez, Regulating Farmers: Lessons Learned from the Delmarva Peninsula,
CHOICES (3d Quarter, 2011), http://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-magazine/theme
-articles/innovating-policy-for-chesapeake-bay-restoration/regulating-farmers-lessons
-learned-from-the-delmarva-peninsula.
232 See Michelle Perez, Does the Policy-Making Process Affect Farmer Compliance? A
Three-State Case Study of Nutrient Management Regulations (Aug. 2010) (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Maryland, College Park), available at http://gradworks.umi.com
/34/09/3409721.html.
233 Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *.
234 Id. at 90–91.
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current policy, many farmers may simply be precluded from participating
in an offset program. The total supply of offsets from agriculture might
then prove to be significantly limited, even when a more generous supply
of agricultural offsets would create major opportunities for wider provision
of offsets, thus offering the potential for large Bay cleanup cost savings.
In other words, a more generous treatment of baseline requirements for
farmers may serve as a more effective means of stimulating agricultural
nutrient load reductions, as compared with the frequently weak enforce-
ment of existing nutrient laws and rules in the agricultural sector.
One possibility is that a benchmark for farmer nutrient flows will
be considered the relevant baseline for generating offsets, whatever the
legal requirements for future actions may be. In other words, farmers
could sell offsets for nutrient reductions that simply bring them into com-
pliance with current legal requirements, as long as these reductions were
below the benchmark. Aside from the issue of potentially rewarding
farmers from evading the nutrient management laws (however wide-
spread this is in practice in the agricultural sector), it will probably be ob-
jected that such a policy will favor the bad actor farmers who have failed
to meet their full legal requirements. Yet, this is a problem that arises
in many government settings. Under the conservation programs of the
Farm Bill, some farmers get paid for doing what other farmers have
already done with their own resources as a matter of upholding good
management principles.235
The World Resources Institute recently analyzed the economics
of a possible offset program for the Mississippi River Basin.236 It proposed
to establish such a benchmark, labeled in the WRI study as a Trading
Eligibility Standard (“TES”).237 This standard would be defined as the
level of farm nutrient flow per acre sufficient to bring about a forty-five
percent reduction in total nutrient flows from the whole area under con-
sideration.238 It then considers the economic and credit trading implica-
tions of two alternatives: (1) credits could be sold only by making actual
“additional” nutrient reductions below an existing farmer nutrient load
level (and also below the TES); and (2) credits could be sold on a “non-
additional” basis for any realization of load levels below the TES, even
235 Id. at xxi, xxiv.
236 Id. at 90.
237 Michelle Perez et al., Nutrient Trading in the MRB, WORLD RESOURCES INST. 6 (June
2009), available at http://pdf.wri.org/nutrient_trading_in_mrb_feasibility_study.pdf.
238 Id.
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if this had already been accomplished by the farmer prior to the com-
mencement of the trading regime.239 In concept, then, depending on the
benchmark, a farmer could sell credits without having fully complied
with all existing state requirements.
The baseline problem being raised here could also be addressed in
another—perhaps preferable—manner. If at present there are too many
“fictional” legal requirements for farmers to make nutrient reductions,
the baseline requirements could themselves be lowered to bring them
closer into line with what farmers will be willing to do voluntarily—and
governments will have a reasonable prospect of being able to enforce.
Consider two possible legal baselines for required nutrient reductions,
level A and level 2A. If level 2A is in practice unenforceable—there could
be many reasons ranging from impossibility of adequately monitoring of
compliance to fierce farmer political resistance that limits the actions of
state officials—it will be harmful to the Bay cleanup to maintain the
higher baseline of 2A. It would be better to lower the baseline to A, and
then let farmers sell offsets as a financial incentive to raise their nutri-
ent reductions to a higher level of 2A. As one might say, rather than
having to receive Farm Bill conservation funding to induce such environ-
mentally beneficial actions, the sale of the additional nutrient offsets
could serve as a substitute financial instrument in place of government
funds that are insufficient to accomplish desired nutrient reductions.
There is also a case for having a more abundant supply of agricul-
tural offsets available in general. As noted above, some currently mandated
nutrient reductions for stormwater are extremely expensive, especially
relative to the costs of making agricultural nutrient reductions. If there
are no offsets available to be acquired by stormwater nutrient sources,
the high costs could lead to fierce political and legal resistance to TMDL
implementation from these sources. Cheaper agricultural offsets, as one
might say, offer a way of letting off the “financial steam” that could other-
wise create unmanageable pressures for the Bay TMDL cleanup efforts.
If these less expensive offsets served to stimulate greater total nutrient
reductions in the agricultural sector, all the better. Fictionally tight agri-
cultural baselines may “feel good”—especially to those who resent farmer
resistance to greater nutrient reductions—but may be counterproductive
to the Bay cleanup that is the ultimate priority.
Such a policy may not be needed, however, in some cases. According
to University of Maryland conservation biology student Nicole Angeli—who
239 Id. at 6, 20, 46.
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worked for several years with local soil conservation offices in Maryland—
there are many farms in Maryland that are already below the nitrogen
baseline for regulatory compliance.240 This means that these farms, if
participating in an offset policy, would be able, even under current base-
line policies to generate significant new income by providing offsets at
present without first having to make further changes in their farm man-
agement practices to achieve a baseline.241
XIII. GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS ON OFFSETS: SOME PROS AND CONS
As noted above, one of the key issues for Bay offset policy is the
level of geographic constraints versus the degree of geographic flexibility
in the availability of offsets, relative to the location of the party acquiring
the offset. This involves various pros and cons as described briefly below.
A. Offsets Within the Same River Basin
Limiting offsets to the same river basin helps to ensure that local
water quality does not suffer from an increase in nutrient loads as the
user of the offset acquires it in another water basin. In other words, any
nutrient reductions required will occur in the same basin, whether
through a direct reduction or through the substitution of an offset some-
where else in the basin. It also ensures that any financial benefits from
offset generation and sale are kept within the same basin. A within-basin
policy might be seen as the most equitable solution in that it keeps the
benefits and costs of offsets confined within the same group of residents
of the basin. It minimizes the potential for political tensions that might
arise if offsets came from a different river basin than the original pollut-
ing source.
In-basin acquisition of offsets could be further restricted to the
same state, or it could allow acquisition across state lines. In some cases
a multistate system of basin offsets would have clear advantages. For
instance, if a water basin in the Maryland Eastern shore allows offsets to
be obtained upriver in Delaware, the offset acquired in Delaware might
be less costly and yet would generate as many or more environmental
benefits as any offset that could be acquired in the same river basin in
Maryland. It would be more difficult, however, if a Delaware nutrient
240 Angeli et. al., supra note 116.
241 Id.
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source acquired an offset from a downstream Maryland source in the
same water basin. In that case, the Maryland source might be less costly
but the environmental benefit of reduced nutrient would not occur within
Delaware, thus creating an economic versus environmental tradeoff (if
the economic benefits are large enough, the tradeoff could of course still
be worth incurring some environmental disadvantages). One option might
be to have a joint Maryland-Delaware body to administer the offset sys-
tem within the river basin and approve offsets in each individual case
after considering such tradeoffs.
B. Offsets Within the Same State
Another possibility would be to allow offsets in the same state,
even when the offset was in a different water basin than the user of the
offset. A pollution source in the Potomac River basin, for example, might
acquire an offset from the Patuxent River basin. There could be economic
benefits from such a policy in two respects: first, the total costs of nutri-
ent reductions within the state might be reduced, if less expensive offsets
were available in the Patuxent basin; and second, there would be the fi-
nancial benefit in the Patuxent watershed where sale of the offset would
occur. Environmentally, the basin supplying the offset would benefit
from the reduced nutrient load it would experience, while the basin of the
offset purchaser would forego a nutrient reduction that otherwise would
have occurred without the offset. Once again, there might be a statewide
body to assess the acceptability in each individual case of proposed off-
sets, based on the tradeoffs that would result from an interbasin trade
within the same state. This in itself could provoke internal tensions with-
in the state, admittedly, as to the appropriate criteria and state fairness
in making such individual determinations; in that case it might be pref-
erable to simply have a general offset policy, yes or no to interbasin trades.
C. Bay-Wide Offset Availability
As noted, the greatest cost savings in terms of the cleanup of the
Chesapeake Bay would come from allowing offsets to be generated any-
where in the Bay watershed. High priority areas such as the Susquehanna
River basin might sell offsets to out-of-state purchasers as a means of fund-
ing major nutrient reductions there with consequent large environmental
benefits to the entire Bay. It might also be argued that sale of offsets from
Pennsylvania to downstream users would serve overall social equity. The
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greatest benefits of the Bay cleanup will be realized by the residents of
Maryland and Virginia, yet some of the greatest environmental benefits
(and lowest economic costs) might be associated with Pennsylvania nu-
trient reductions.242 So it might more closely align the location of total
economic and environmental benefits and costs by having Maryland nutri-
ent polluters pay for significant cost-effective reductions in Pennsylvania
through the workings of an offset system.
Environmental and cost-effectiveness considerations might sim-
ilarly argue for letting Virginia nutrient polluters obtain their offsets
from Maryland. Depending on the exact circumstances, the pollution re-
ductions in Maryland might have a greater beneficial impact on Bay water
quality, as compared with the same expenditures for pollution reductions
in Virginia that would reach the Bay closer to the Atlantic Ocean. For ex-
ample, the James River nutrient flows that enter the Chesapeake Bay near
the mouth of the Bay will typically have a smaller overall impact on the
health of the Bay than nutrient flows originating in either Maryland or
Pennsylvania.243 An offset system that results in James River polluters
paying for nutrient reduction offsets in Maryland thus might offer signif-
icant economic and environmental benefits from a Bay-wide perspective.
Of course, as noted previously, this would result in unchanged nutrient
flows in the James River itself, raising potential water quality issues there.
D. Separate Offset Policies for Nitrogen and Phosphorus?
The three pollutant loads designated for reduction by the Bay
TMDL are nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment. Acquisition of offsets for
nitrogen and phosphorus flows would take place separately, but it has
typically been assumed that the geographic constraints in terms of the
boundaries of the trading systems would be the same.244 It is important
to recognize, however, that nitrogen and phosphorus have different phys-
ical characteristics that create significant differences in their effects on
aquatic plant growth in freshwater and saltwater.245 Nitrogen is more
242 Pennsylvania is the source of a large part of the nutrient pollution into the bay
(through the Susquehanna River, as discussed above). Yet, Pennsylvania does not border
the Bay. The residents of Maryland and Virginia will thus have easier access to the bay
and its benefits.
243 See “Save the Bay,” VIRGINIAPLACES.ORG, http://www.virginiaplaces.org/chesbay
/savethebay.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
244 Envtl. Pol’y Workshop, supra note *, at 106.
245 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE QUALITY OF OUR NATION’S WATERS—NUTRIENTS AND
PESTICIDES, U.S. GEOLOGICAL CIRCULAR 1225 (1999).
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readily dissolvable in water; this means that nitrogen travels more rap-
idly to the Chesapeake Bay while phosphorus and sediment typically re-
main longer in water basins, moving more slowly to the Bay.246 As a result,
phosphorus tends to contribute more than nitrogen to eutrophication of
freshwater rivers and streams.247 By contrast, excess nitrogen typically
creates the greatest problems of algal blooms in coastal Bay waters with
higher salt concentrations.248 Indeed, nitrogen is generally the primary
limiting nutrient in the seaward portions of estuarine systems, while in
freshwater lakes, ponds, reservoirs, and streams, phosphorus is the nu-
trient that has the most influence on plant growth and other nutrient
pollution problems.249
These different physical characteristics of nitrogen and phospho-
rus have potentially significant implications for the geography of Bay
offsets. For nitrogen, the potential for hot spots in individual river basins
is less than that for phosphorus.250 The largest negative impacts of nitro-
gen pollution are felt in the Bay itself. This suggests that an offset policy
might allow for nitrogen offsets available over wider geographic areas
such as multiple states and basins, potentially even the whole Bay water-
shed. If nitrogen trading were to occur over wide geographic areas, there
might be significant overall cost savings, while the disadvantages for in-
dividual river basins of such nutrient trading would be minimized—at
least relative to phosphorus. For example, cross state nitrogen trading
between Maryland and Pennsylvania water basins might be permitted.
Phosphorus trading, however, might be confined to the same basin.
E. Bay Water Basin “Attainment Areas”
In the administration of the Clean Air Act, the nation is divided
into “attainment” and “nonattainment” areas for ambient air quality
standards.251 There are large differences in the requirements of the Clean
Air Act according to the attainment or nonattainment status of an air
quality basis. The river basins of the Chesapeake Bay might similarly be
246 Nitrogen (N) and Water, LENNTECH, http://www.lenntech.com/periodic/water/nitrogen
/nitrogen-and-water.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See ASIT K. BISWAS ET AL., WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 56
(Springer 2006).
251 The Green Book Nonattainment Areas for Criteria Pollutants, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/air
quality/greenbk/ (last updated Dec. 5, 2013); see also SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 67.
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divided into attainment and nonattainment areas according to whether
water quality goals are currently being met (“attained”) or not. Attainment
areas would include those river basins where the water quality is already
capable of supporting the designated water uses, as compared with basins
that have not yet come into “attainment” with nutrient targets.
In particular, if an individual river basin has already met its water
quality targets (perhaps as the result of a successful TMDL implementa-
tion), the case for limiting offsets to that same river basin is diminished.
Rather, if the offsets are obtained in another river basin that has not yet
met its water quality targets, one might argue that this is itself environ-
mentally preferable. One water basin already in attainment status would
continue to be in attainment, while another separate basin—the provider
of the offsets—would move closer to fulfilling its TMDL goals, even as
total nutrient flows to the Bay itself would remain the same.
Given that large reductions in future years should bring many
more water basins into attainment of their TMDL goals, it is feasible to
think that under such a policy increasing numbers of river basins will be-
come eligible to acquire offsets outside the local basin itself. According to
EPA, at present an estimated 9 million pounds of nitrogen and 200,000
pounds of phosphorus could be traded without causing water quality im-
pacts in the tidal segment receiving the increase, or credited, load.252
CONCLUSION
Under the Clean Water Act, a TMDL is a plan to achieve a water
quality objective for a given water body within some future time period.253
Under the Clean Air Act, a SIP is a plan to achieve an air quality objec-
tive for a given airshed within some future time period.254 Indeed, while
there are some differences (e.g., the water quality objective can be estab-
lished by the individual state, while EPA establishes a single nationwide
air quality standard), in most respects a TMDL is the water quality ver-
sion of a SIP for improved air quality. But the states have been writing
SIPs since the early 1970s, while the writing of TMDLs is much more re-
cent (EPA and the states simply ignored the TMDL language of the Clean
Water Act until the 1990s).255
252 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM’N, NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING, supra note 105.
253 HOUCK, supra note 16.
254 See What Is a State Implementation Plan (SIP)?, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/reg3artd
/airregulations/sips/sipdetail.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
255 HOUCK, supra note 16.
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In considering the prospects for TMDL success in achieving water
quality goals, it is thus instructive to consider the outcomes of SIPs. For
some forms of air pollution such as nitrogen dioxide, the CAA ambient
standards have been met everywhere, or almost everywhere, in the United
States.256 For other types of air pollution such as ozone, however, 123 mil-
lion Americans were still living in ozone “nonattainment” areas as of 2010,
even as the CAA was enacted more than forty years ago.257 In such non-
attainment areas, multiple SIPs have been written over the years, and
approved by EPA and “implemented” by the states, setting out detailed
plans for coming into full compliance with the ozone air quality standard,
typically within a five to ten year time frame.258 Obviously, these SIPs in
current nonattainment areas all failed to accomplish their stated objec-
tives, multiple times over.
It has been so difficult to meet ozone air quality standards because
the levels of ozone are so closely tied to the broader workings of transpor-
tation, electric power production, and other core elements of the economy.
Whatever the official requirements of a SIP, they are not easily changed,
and when push comes to shove, it is the SIP that gives way. The same is
true, however, for achieving nutrient pollution load reductions in a com-
plex economic circumstance such as the full Chesapeake Bay watershed.
It would certainly not be surprising, indeed it is probably likely, that the
2010 Bay TMDL will meet the same fate as all the many failed SIPs writ-
ten for areas that are still in air quality nonattainment today forty years
after the first SIP.
Air quality has nevertheless improved greatly in the United
States, even if not as much as had initially been hoped for.259 Key factors
have been the regulation of air emissions from trucks and automobiles
and from brand new stationary sources of air pollution, both of which are
nationwide standards outside the scope of SIPs to influence.260 Another
key factor has been the incorporation of offsets into the administration of
the CAA for two especially important conventional air pollutants, sulphur
256 See State Designations, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/nitrogenoxides/designations
/state.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
257 EPA, SUMMARY NONATTAINMENT AREA POPULATION EXPOSURE REPORT, http://www.epa
.gov/airquality/greenbook/popexp.html (last updated Dec. 5, 2013).
258 See National Academy of Sciences, Air Quality Management in the United States Ch. 3
(Washington, D.C.: NAS, 2004).
259 See Air Quality Trends, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/aqtrends.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2014).
260 SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 67.
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dioxide and nitrogen oxides.261 As authorized by the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, offsets have been bought and sold in full fledged cap and
trade offset systems operating for these pollutants since the 1990s, re-
sulting in large cost-effective reductions in total air pollutant loads.262
A similar scenario may well play out for Chesapeake Bay water
quality. EPA permits significantly tightened the nutrient reduction re-
quirements for Bay watershed WWTPs and many upgrades were already
taking place before the Bay TMDL was written (and have resulted in
significant nutrient load reductions in recent years).263 EPA also directly
regulates many local stormwater systems that qualify as point sources
under its MS4 standards—again increasingly requiring upgrades in re-
cent years that would have occurred with or without the TMDL.264 Bay
states have been attempting to require farmers to write BMPs including
nutrient load reductions for at least a decade and have been increasing
the pressure (with mixed success) on farmers to actually implement them.
The projected nutrient reductions from all of these preexisting efforts have
been included as part of the 2010 Bay TMDL to meet its official nutrient
targets for 2017 and 2025. The efforts will continue whatever the fate of
the TMDL will be, but the actual reductions they will achieve will depend
on many uncertainties that remain to be resolved.
The one important CAA strategy that has not been much em-
ployed in the Bay cleanup is the use of offsets. An offset system could
result in large savings in total Bay cleanup costs—perhaps fifty percent
or more—while achieving equal or superior environmental results. The
Bay TMDL included a provision for the use of offsets but almost as an
afterthought. Almost all the details of implementation of offset systems,
probably including prominently full cap and trade systems, was left to
the states and to the future. These efforts have since been proceeding
slowly. The Bay TMDL thus failed to seize the moment in the one area
where it could have introduced critical new ideas and nutrient control
methods, a large role for offsets in the future in the Bay cleanup.
261 See Cap and Trade Basics, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/captrade.html (last
updated May 18, 2012).
262 Id.
263 See, e.g., Bay Restoration Fund, MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, http://www.mde.state.md.us
/programs/Water/BayRestorationFund/Pages/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
264 See, e.g., Erica Goldman, Urban Stormwater and the Bay, CHESAPEAKE QUARTERLY
ONLINE, http://ww2.mdsg.umd.edu/cq/v07n2/side4/ (last updated Aug. 29, 2013).
